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INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises1 (The Nation), the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"[e]specially in the realm of factual narrative, the law is currently un-
settled regarding the ways in which copyrightable elements combine
with the author's original contributions to form protected expression."
'2
The Court's acknowledgment reflects the considerable confusion that
characterizes judicial analysis of copyright infringement claims involv-
ing factual works, or "works which compile and communicate factual
information about our society and the world about us, past and pres-
ent."'3 Examples of such works include business reports,4 maps,5 legal'
and business forms,7 and historical' and biographical narratives.9 If the
world is not to "'be deprived of improvements, or the progress of the
arts . . . retarded,' " then factual works must be broadly dissemi-
nated."0 The difficulty arises in the context of determining under what
circumstances, if any, noncopyrightable factual materials may receive
some measure of protection by being combined with copyrightable ma-
terial into a protectible totality.
1 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
2 Id. at 2224.
1 Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 560, 561 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
6 See, e.g., Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
7 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
8 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
1 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
10 Id. at 307 (quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 (K.B. 1801)).
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This confusion concerning factual works is illustrated dramatically
in the analyses of the district court, court of appeals, and Supreme
Court opinions in The Nation. The issue presented was whether ap-
propriation by a news magazine, The Nation, of portions of the then
unpublished memoirs of former President Gerald Ford constituted
copyright infringement. The district court recognized that the historical
facts and other factual material contained in the memoirs were not per
se copyrightable, 1 but argued that because those facts were necessary
parts of Ford's own personal revelation, the factual materials and reve-
lations merged to become a protected totality infringed by The Nation's
use.12 The district court also held that the use did not qualify as a "fair
use" under the 1976 Copyright Act."3 The court of appeals rejected the
totality theory, holding that only the literal expression or direct quota-
tion of the factual elements was protectible and that the fair use doc-
trine protected the limited use of verbatim quotations of the memoirs by
The Nation.4 The Supreme Court, ostensibly focusing only on the fair
use question as it concerned the verbatim quotations, reversed the court
of appeals and found that the appropriation of literal expression by The
Nation did not constitute fair use. 5 The Court thereby appeared to
have avoided the need to address explicitly the merits of the totality
theory, but the Court adopted some of the district court's findings,
which were predicated on the totality approach, in its own fair use
" See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
12 See id.
13 See id. (construing the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)).
"Fair use" was originally a judicially created privilege to use copyrighted material, and
in 1976 was embodied in the copyright statute. The statutory embodiment of the doc-
trine provides that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par-
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
14 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204-08 (2d
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
15 See 105 S. Ct. at 2227-35.
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analysis. This adoption at least suggests that the Court viewed the dis-
trict court's totality approach in a favorable light.'6
The conflict evident among the radically different opinions in The
Nation is symptomatic of copyright analysis of factual works generally.
For decades, courts have struggled unsuccessfully with the application
of copyright doctrines to factual works. Most courts have tended toward
accepting various forms of the "totality approach." This approach may
be defined as any legal theory that accords noncopyrightable facts some
measure of copyright protection when these facts are somehow com-
bined with copyrightable expression into a protectible totality. The to-
tality approach has taken three distinct forms. First, courts have de-
fined copyrightable expression to include noncopyrightable facts for
purposes of determining whether a subsequent writing is substantially
similar to the expression alleged to be infringed. 1 Second, courts have
applied the same standard of infringement to factual and fictional ex-
pression.' 8 Third, courts have applied a theory called "wholesale usur-
pation,"' 9 according to which courts find infringement of copyright in
factual works if the subsequent user appropriates "the total entity with
its unique and protected mosaic," comprising the overall arrangement
and selection of facts.20
Until the Supreme Court's decision in The Nation, it was not nec-
essary either as a matter of copyright doctrine or for first amendment
purposes to face the complex task of formulating coherent standards for
the copyright and infringement of factual works. The reason it was not
necessary is that the fair use doctrine was a "cure-all" for the problems
in this area. Irrespective of whether factual works were accorded broad
copyright protection, an expansive interpretation of the fair use doc-
trine was always available and often utilized to protect the subsequent
use and dissemination of factual information.
In The Nation, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
placed the cure-all of fair use in a very small bottle by truncating sub-
stantially the fair use defense."' As a result, the dissemination of factual
works is being squeezed dangerously from both sides of copyright doc-
trine. On one side, judicial approval of the totality approach in any of
its forms provides excessive copyright protection to factual works. On
the other side, the doctrine of fair use, previously used by courts and
16 See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
'7 See infra notes 178-241 and accompanying text.
'8 See infra notes 242-81 and accompanying text.
19 E.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980).
20 The Nation, 723 F.2d at 203; see also infra notes 282-366 and accompanying
text. 21 See infra notes 135-73 and accompanying text.
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recommended by commentators as a means of legitimizing some uses of
factual works,22 will, in all likelihood, now fail to excuse the increased
infringement that results from this broader protection. Unless some ju-
dicial or legislative action is taken, this double squeeze threatens to im-
pede the dissemination of such works to a degree prohibited by the
Constitution and copyright statutes.
In Part I of this Article, I examine briefly the three opinions in
The Nation in order to highlight the different copyright approaches
apparent in the opinions. I then set out some of the features of copy-
right law that account for the tension underlying these different ap-
proaches to copyright analysis. Part II examines how the Supreme
Court's opinion in The Nation has restricted fair use analysis in ways
that will increase the number of infringement claims involving factual
works. This restricted fair use doctrine necessitates that courts begin to
unravel the confusion that has infected copyrightability and infringe-
ment doctrines, because these doctrines will remain the only means by
which courts will be able to ensure the continued broad dissemination
of factual works. In Part III, I explore the confusion in copyrightability
and infringement doctrines caused by the combination of unprotectible
elements into totalities protectible by copyright law. I demonstrate the
inadequacies of the various forms of the totality approach, and also take
issue with those commentators who support the expanded copyright
protection represented by totality analysis. The thrust of my argument
is that because some limited version of the fair use doctrine is here to
stay, and perhaps appropriately so, the basic purposes of copyright law,
as well as the first amendment, would best be served by rejecting all
forms of the totality approach.
I. The Nation: AN EXAMINATION OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO
COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS
A. The Separate Opinions
Shortly after Gerald Ford left the White House, he entered into
an agreement with Harper & Row and Reader's Digest, Inc. (the
"publishers") to prepare his memoirs for publication. Although it was
22 See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protec-
tion of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981); Patry, Copyright
in Collections of Facts: A Reply, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
627 (D. Goldberg ed. 1985); Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A
Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 647 (1982); Gorman, supra note 3;
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REv. 1569 (1963).
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understood that the memoirs would not contain "sensational" revela-
tions, the agreement specified that Ford would present previously un-
published material concerning his relationship with former President
Richard Nixon, Nixon's reaction to the Watergate crisis, Ford's pardon
of Nixon, and Ford's "reflections on this period of history, and the
morality and personalities involved."2 Ford granted the exclusive right
to publish the memoirs as a book, as well as certain exclusive rights "to
exercise, sell, license or otherwise dispose of any and all of the subsidi-
ary rights" prior to publication.2" The extensive interview, research,
and initial drafting were done by a professional writer hired by Ford.
On March 14, 1979, the publishers granted an exclusive license to
Time, Inc. ("Time"), to publish excerpts from the memoirs that fo-
cused on Nixon's resignation and pardon. This issue of Time magazine
was to go on sale on April 16, 1979.25 Time agreed to pay the publish-
ers $25,000 for the license, one-half payable upon execution of the li-
censing agreement, and the remainder upon Time's publication of the
excerpts. 26 The agreement between the publishers and Time provided
that the parties would use reasonable effort to keep the licensed mate-
rial confidential and that any publication prior to or simultaneous with
Time's publication would give Time the right to renegotiate the second
payment. As a result, Harper & Row required all of its employees who
had access to the manuscript to sign an agreement to keep the memoirs
confidential.27
Sometime late in March 1979, Victor Navasky, editor of The Na-
tion, a political commentary and news magazine, received a copy of the
Ford manuscript from an unidentified source who Navasky knew was
not authorized to provide the manuscript. Navasky did not know at the
time he received possession that Time was licensed to publish excerpts,
and believing that the manuscript contained important political mate-
rial, he decided to publish an article based on material contained in the
memoirs.28 The article, which was approximately 2250 words in
length, appeared in The Nation on April 3, 1979.29 The article con-
22 Joint Appendix at JA-486, The Nation.
24 Id. at JA-481.
25 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at 6, The Nation.
28 Id.
217 See id. at C19-C20.
28 See The Nation, 723 F.2d at 198.
9 Id. The article was appended to the district court opinion, see 557 F. Supp. at
1073 app., the court of appeals opinion, see 723 F.2d at 209 app., and the Supreme
Court opinion, see 105 S. Ct. at 2236 app. The article discusses Ford's pardon of
Nixon when Nixon was ill with phlebitis, Ford's comments on Nixon's character,
Ford's interaction with various political figures, and Ford's decision to run again for
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tained material on Nixon's resignation and pardon, but also included
material apparently not to be excerpted and published by Time. When
Time learned of The Nation's article, it sought permission to print the
excerpts in an earlier issue of Time. The publishers refused, and Time
neither printed any excerpts nor paid the remaining $12,500. o The
publishers then sued The Nation for copyright infringement and for
various state-law violations.31
1. The District Court: The Totality Theory
The district court began its analysis by noting that because the
memoirs were protected by copyright, The Nation article was "an in-
fringement of that copyright, unless otherwise privileged." 2 The court
examined, and rejected, three arguments made by the defendants. One
argument the court rejected was the defendants' fair use defense, 3
which relied on the theory that the memoirs were "news." The court
held that the article was not news because, as Navasky had acknowl-
edged, what Navasky considered to be newsworthy in his story had
been previously recounted in other sources. " The court then assessed
the presidency. It concludes with a brief comment on the propriety of Navasky's dis-
closure of the material.
30 See The Nation, 723 F.2d at 199.
31 The district court granted a motion to dismiss the state-law claims on the
ground that they were preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101-810
(1982). See The Nation, 501 F. Supp. at 853-54 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301). The pub-
lishers later filed an amended complaint that was denied on the same ground. The
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state-law claims; the court agreed that the
claims were preempted by the Copyright Act. See The Nation, 723 F.2d at 199-201.
32 The Nation, 557 F. Supp. at 1070. In connection with the issue of copyright
protection for the memoirs, the court noted that the memoirs constituted a "literary
work" within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1982), and that the original pub-
lishing agreement between the publishers and Ford was recorded in accordance with 17
U.S.C. § 205(d) (1982). See 557 F. Supp. at 1070 n.3.
11 See supra note 13.
34 See 557 F. Supp. at 1070-72. Specifically, Navasky testified that he believed
certain portions of the memoirs relating to conversations between Ford and White
House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig were "hot news." See id. at 1070-71. Haig had
suggested to Ford that Nixon's resignation might be made contingent on Ford's pardon.
See id. at 1074 app. (text of the article in The Nation). Navasky also testified that he
believed that "there was possibly an obstruction of justice in the transaction and in the
story." Id. at 1070-71 (footnote omitted). The court determined that Navasky's views
about a possible obstruction of justice were based on "sheer speculation," id. at 1070
n.6, and noted that the Ford-Haig conversations had been revealed by Ford in an ap-
pearance before a congressional committee in 1974. See id. at 1071. The court also
pointed out that a potentially newsworthy memorandum by Henry S. Ruth, Jr., an
assistant to Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, to Jaworski had already been
revealed in a book by Jaworski. See id. at 1071 n.9.
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the individual fair use factors and found none of them to be applicable:
First, the article was published for profit. Second, the in-
fringed work was soon-to-be published. Third, The Nation
took what was essentially the heart of the book, and fourth,
the effect of The Nation's extensive use of the Nixon pardon
material caused the Time agreement to be aborted and thus
diminished the value of the copyright.3 5
Another argument that the defendants made was that, notwith-
standing any copyright in the memoirs, the defendants' use was pro-
tected by the first amendment." The court rejected this argument in a
footnote, maintaining that "[w]hile there may be a circumstance in
which the First Amendment provides a defendant with greater protec-
tion than the fair use doctrine," this was not such a circumstance.
37
Finally, The Nation argued that copyright protection could not ex-
tend to those portions of Ford's memoirs concerned with historical facts,
texts of government memoranda prepared by individuals other than
Ford, and quoted statements of persons other than Ford. If these alleg-
edly noncopyrightable materials were removed from consideration, the
defendants argued, any taking of the remaining copyrightable material
would be excusable. Although the court acknowledged that these cate-
gories of materials were not "per se copyrightable," ' the court decided
that they were "integral and necessary components of the context of
Ford's revelations as to his state of mind"3 9 and, therefore, that the
"totality" of the noncopyrightable elements, together with Ford's reve-
lations about them, was "protected by the copyright laws.
4 0
" Id. at 1072 (footnotes omitted). The Nation also argued that Time was willing
to print the excerpts if the publishers would allow it to do so earlier than originally
agreed. The court observed that the publishers declined Time's request because the
difference of one week would create an unacceptably long interval between Time's pub-
lication of the excerpts and the availability of the book in bookstores. The court refused
"to second-guess the plaintiffs' business judgment in this regard." Id. at 1072 n.11.
36 See id. at 1070 n.4.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1072. With respect to the portions of the memoirs that recited statements
of others, the court declined to attempt to separate exact quotations from reconstruc-
tions. The court suspected that "most [statements] were to some degree reconstruc-
tions." Id. at 1073.
" Id. at 1073. The Second Circuit expressed confusion over the meaning of "reve-
lations" in the district court opinion. See infra note 58.
40 See 557 F. Supp. at 1072. This view of the copyrightability of the "totality"
could be anticipated by the court's earlier statement that because the memoirs were
protected by copyright, Navasky's article was an infringement unless privileged. The
district court's statement that facts are "not per se copyrightable" reflected the court's
view that facts could be given protection under certain circumstances, such as when the
facts are "integral and necessary components of the context of Ford's revelations as to
his state of mind." The locution used throughout this Article is that facts are "per se
[Vol. 134:519
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2. The Court of Appeals: Facts as the " 'Property of All' "41
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court on the
issue of copyright infringement. 42 Unlike the trial court, which had dis-
cussed issues of copyrightability only after it considered the defendant's
fair use arguments, the Second Circuit began its analysis with the issue
whether the material used by Navasky was copyrightable. In its some-
what convoluted discussion of this issue, the court emphasized the dis-
tinction between ideas and facts, which are not protectible, and expres-
sion, which is protectible.4" This distinction, according to the court,
ensures that the copyright monopoly does not create an "'intolerable
limitation on First Amendment rights.'"" The first amendment values
served by the distinction were particularly acute in this case:
Nowhere could the need to construe the concept of
copyrightability in accord with First Amendment freedoms
be more important than in the instant case. Here we are
presented with an article describing political events of major
significance, involving a former President of the United
States. The paraphrasings concern the very essence of news
and of history.
45
The idea/expression or fact/expression distinction informed by
these heightened first amendment concerns guided the Second Circuit's
determination of copyrightability in four salient respects. First, al-
though the court noted that Ford's actual expression was protected by
copyright, it "confined that troublesome concept 'expression' to its
barest elements-the ordering and choice of the words themselves."1
46
The court expressed no doubt that Ford's verbatim language was pro-
noncopyrightable," which reflects the view that facts cannot be made copyrightable
through the merger of fact and expression. It is recognized that both locutions are ques-
tion begging to some degree, because each reflects a conclusion about the totality
approach.
41 The Nation, 723 F.2d at 209 (quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618
F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980)).
42 See id. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the state-
law claims. See id. at 199-201.
41 See id. at 202-04.
"" Id. at 204 n.12 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[E]
(1985)).
45 Id. at 204.
48 Id. The court cited Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), for the proposition that the first amendment re-
quires that protectible expression be understood as involving only the ordering and
choice of actual words. See 723 F.2d at 204. This interpretation suggests that the court
did not confine its first amendment concerns to political matters, but extended it to
include works of history as well.
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tected, 47 but it also made clear that conversations and documents attrib-
uted to those other than Ford48 and information previously presented in
a government document49 could not receive copyright protection.
Second, the court held that the "definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act [that] permit[s] the free com-
munication of facts while still protecting an author's expression" 50 re-
quired that paraphrasing of discrete facts be permitted. To hold other-
wise, the court asserted, "ignores the unambiguous legislative history
which establishes that 'information' is not protected.""1 Infringement in
this context would, therefore, require that the user paraphrase the en-
tire work or all of a chapter.
52
Third, the court stated that "[a]n author's originality exists, in
part, in his overall arrangement of facts."53 Because Navasky's article
"drew only upon scattered parts" of the work and therefore did not
disrupt the "structure . . . [of] the work as a whole," the court con-
cluded that Ford's expression, represented in the "total entity with its
unique and protected mosaic," was not in any way usurped.4
Navasky's use of the particular subset of factual material would not
present a problem because those facts would not, in and of themselves,
be subject to copyright protection.
Finally, the court rejected the trial court's totality theory-that
even though the facts, memoranda, and conversations were not copy-
rightable, they somehow became protectible when "integral" to Ford's
"revelations." 55 The court reasoned that because Ford's literal words
47 See 723 F.2d at 204.
'8 See id. at 205. The court held that because such conversations and documents
were not Ford's work they did not meet the statutory requirement of originality, see 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), and could not be protected. See 723 F.2d at 205.
49 See 723 F.2d at 205 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982)). The court referred in
particular to information that Ford had presented to a congressional subcommittee. See
id. (citing Pardon of Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 90-151 (1974)).
50 Id. at 203.
51 Id. at 204 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670).
62 See id. at 203.
5 Id.
5Id.
15 Id. at 204. There is some confusion about the meaning of "revelations" and
"reflections" in both the district court and court of appeals opinions. It is unclear
whether the district court meant that Ford's actual utterance of factual information
somehow transformed the noncopyrightable information into copyrightable information,
or whether it meant that Ford's assertions about his mental processes together with his
factual utterances combined to create the protectible "totality." The district court stated
that the factual information, memoranda, and third-party statements were "integral
and necessary components of the context of Ford's revelations." 557 F. Supp. at 1073.
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were "unquestionably copyrightable" and because most of the "revela-
tions" in question were taken verbatim from the memoirs, it was not
necessary to determine whether these revelations were properly charac-
terized as fact or as expression.56 The court noted, however, that it
would "defy common sense" 57 to treat Ford's "states of mind" about
political decisions as any less factual than public acts, especially if those
"states of mind" were described in other than Ford's words. 8
The court concluded that once these copyrightability issues were
resolved, the only remaining material that Navasky could have in-
fringed consisted of approximately 300 words that were taken verbatim
from the memoirs and that did not represent quotations of third parties
or material from other unprotectible sources. 5' The court rejected the
trial court's analysis that Navasky's article failed to be "good or genu-
ine news" and stressed that neither the statute. nor the case law re-
quired that fair use be determined by how well Navasky performed his
task.60 The issue then became whether Navasky's use of these 300
words constituted a fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act."1
Turning to its fair use analysis, the court of appeals declared the
district court's analysis erroneous with regard to each individual factor.
Despite the trial court's finding that the "'article was published for
profit,' ",62 the Second Circuit noted that profit was "legally irrelevant"
when public benefit was involved.63 As for the "nature of the copy-
righted work," the court of appeals determined that because the
memoirs were factual in nature, the district court erred when it de-
clined to afford the work more narrow protection.64 Rejected also were
the trial court's conclusions that Navasky had used "the heart of the
book" and that the use had adverse economic impact on the publishers,
because such findings were based on the trial court's incorrect totality
analysis-that the noncopyrightable elements somehow "merged" into
It seems, therefore, that the district court thought that Ford's utterance of statements
containing these data made them protectible.
The Second Circuit seemed to subscribe to the view that Ford's "revelations" re-
ferred to his "states of mind" relevant to the decisions described in Navasky's article.
See 723 F.2d at 205 & n.14. This reasoning suggests that the Second Circuit under-
stood the district court's "totality" approach as combining Ford's assertions about his
mental processes with his factual utterances.
56 See 723 F.2d at 204.
67 Id. at 205.
"' See id. at 205 & n.14.
59 See id. at 206.
60 See id. at 207.
61 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13.
62 723 F.2d at 207 (quoting 557 F. Supp. at 1072).
e See id. at 208.
See id.
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protected expression by virtue of Ford's "reflections" and revelations.6 5
In light of the court of appeals' analysis of the fair use factors and
its observation that the quoted portions, for the most part, gave "au-
thenticity to this politically significant material" and provided "the
reader with a means of evaluating" certain claims made by Ford, the
court concluded that Navasky's minimal use of the copyrighted expres-
sion was a fair use.6" The court determined that "[t]o decide otherwise
would be to ignore those values of free expression which have tradition-
ally been accommodated by the statute's 'fair use' provisions. "67
3. The Supreme Court: Fair Use and Unpublished Memoirs
After its statement of the basic principles of copyright law and
review of the lower court opinions, the Court, by Justice O'Connor,
observed that "[p]erhaps the controversy between the lower courts in
this case over copyrightability is more aptly styled a dispute over
whether The Nation's appropriation of unoriginal and uncopyrightable
elements encroached on the originality embodied in the work as a
whole." ' The Court concluded that it was not necessary to resolve the
conflict over the proper standards for copyrightability of factual works6"
01 See id. at 208.
e See id.
Id. Judge Meskill filed a dissenting opinion that took issue with the majority's
analyses of both copyrightability and fair use. Regarding the former, Judge Meskill
argued, inter alia, that the trial court's "totality analysis" was correct and that facts
may be subject to copyright protection in such a way that paraphrasing of discrete facts
may constitute infringement if the paraphrased work, or a work containing paraphras-
ing in combination with appropriated verbatim expression, results in a work that is
substantially similar to the original work. See id. at 214. Although Judge Meskill con-
tended that protection for factual works does not imply protection for the facts them-
selves, he nevertheless seemed to confuse these issues. See id. at 202 n.8. He also argued
that the permissible use of facts by a second author required that the author add some-
thing "original" to the prior work. See id. at 214.
Turning to the fair use analysis, Judge Meskill first agreed with the majority that
"[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not news." Id. at 215. He
then went on to argue, however, that the proper coverage of a news event must "con-
tain original material," and that Navasky could not properly rely exclusively on the
copyrighted memoirs for his news story, See id. at 215. In Judge Meskill's view,
Navasky appropriated "some of the most vivid parts of the book," and this appropria-
tion went beyond what was necessary to write a news article. See id. at 216. Judge
Meskill also determined that the article in The Nation represented an instance of com-
mercial exploitation that created a "substantial incursion" into the market for the pri-
mary work. See id.
68 The Nation, 105 S. Ct. at 2224. Actually, the controversy between the court of
appeals and the district court focused more on the proposition advanced by the district
court, and rejected by the Second Circuit, that elements of Ford's memoirs acknowl-
edged not to be per se copyrightable became copyrightable as a "totality" when com-
bined with Ford's "reflections" and "revelations" about those elements.
69 Curiously, the Court cited Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp.,
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because "[t]he Nation has admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the
author's original language totalling between 300 and 400 words and
constituting some 13% of The Nation article." ' In the Court's view,
this use "was not a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright
Act,"'1 1 and the first amendment provided no protection apart from the
fair use defense.
7 2
It is curious that the Court chose to focus on the fair use doctrine,
rather than the dispute between the district court and court of appeals
concerning the extent to which copyright protection could be used to
protect factual material. Whether fair use exists in any particular case
is generally an issue of fact7" or a mixed issue of law and fact, 4 that
requires the trier of fact to apply an ill-defined "'equitable rule of
reason' ,5 on an ad hoc basis. Appellate courts usually engage in such
analysis only when the facts found by the trial court are sufficient to
allow the appellate court to evaluate the fair use factors, which are
inherently fact specific.76 The Court in The Nation recognized the fac-
tual nature of the fair use inquiry, but determined that the district
court had done sufficient factfinding to permit a fair use inquiry at the
appellate level.77 The problem here is that the district court never fo-
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978), and Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), as
cases presenting two different treatments of the copyrightability of factual material.
Conversely, the Second Circuit majority saw no inconsistency or conflict between Wain-
wright and Hoehling and relied on both to support its view on copyrightability. See 723
F.2d at 202. Judge Meskill in dissent agreed that there was no inconsistency between
the two cases, but thought they both supported the contrary view. See id. at 212-16.
" The Nation, 105 S. Ct. at 2225. It appears that the 300-400 words to which the
Court referred were the verbatim quotes discussed by the Second Circuit in its fair use
analysis. See id. at 2233 n.8. The Court noted that although it did not consider quota-
tions attributed to persons other than Ford or quotations from government documents
to be "potentially infringing," these exclusions were not intended "to endorse any par-
ticular rule of copyrightability." Id.
71 Id. at 2225. The district court's findings related to its "totality" analysis; the
district court made no findings for the purpose of evaluating fair use that focused on
Navasky's use of the verbatim expression. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the
district court "found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors." Id. at
2231.
72 See id. at 2228-30.
'3 See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1985).
" See Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1985).
"' Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5679-80).
78 See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1985).
'7 See 105 S. Ct. at 2231. The Court cited Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1985), for the proposition that it
was not necessary to remand for factfinding on the issue of fair use, and that the Court
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cused on the verbatim quotations, and its factfinding was entirely pred-
icated on its totality analysis. These findings were then incorporated
into the Court's fair use analysis in ways that will be explained below.
In connection with the first statutory factor of fair use-purpose
and character of the use-the Court decided that although Navasky's
article was arguably news, 8 it was commercial in nature and was pre-
sumptively an unfair use under the Court's decision in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios."9 The Court also noted that the article had the
intended purpose of "scooping" the book and Time magazine's prepub-
lication, and that Navasky acted in bad faith because he "knowingly
exploited a purloined manuscript."80
As to the nature of the copyrighted work, the Court acknowledged
that "[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate fac-
tual works than works of fiction or fantasy," and that Navasky argua-
could decide the fair use issue "'as a matter of law.'" 105 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting
Duncan, 744 F.2d at 1495).
There are two problems with the Court's reliance on Duncan. First, in Duncan,
the appellate court did not rely on factual findings that were predicated on a different
concept of copyrightability than that accepted by the appellate court. In The Nation, by
contrast, the Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to pass on the validity of
the district court's totality theory of copyright, but then, at least in part, adopted the
district coiurt's findings predicated on that approach. Second, there is some ambiguity in
the Court's notion that the fair use issue can be decided as a "matter of law." The
Court did not make clear whether it meant that if there are sufficient facts, the Court
can engage in fair use balancing as would any trier of fact, or merely that reasonable
minds could not conclude that Navasky had made a fair use of the quoted portions. If
the Court meant the latter, then a problem still remains in that the Court decided the
fair use issue as a matter of law by considering facts based on a totality theory of
copyright that the Court claimed not to accept or reject. If the Court meant the former,
then the Court should have remanded the case for findings on the fair use issue as those
facts were applied to Navasky's use of the quoted materials. A remand would have
accorded with the Court's usual practice under such circumstances-general avoidance
of review or decision of factual issues. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S.
220, 227 (1925).
78 The Court so decided despite the fact that Justice O'Connor agreed with dis-
senting Judge Meskill's observation in the opinion below that "[c]ourts should be chary
of deciding what is and what is not news." 105 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting The Nation,
723 F.2d at 215 (Meskill, J., dissenting)). Victor Navasky, in an editorial in the New
York Times, remarked that the majority opinion "does just that." N.Y. Times, July 2,
1985, at A19, col. 2. According to Navasky, the Court had assumed that The Nation
was making the same news that former President Ford would eventually make. What
the Court failed to understand, claimed Navasky, is that "the same set of facts can ...
make vastly different points." Id. The Court had, concerning Ford's pardon of Nixon,
"confused Mr. Ford's news-of-his-innocence with The Nation's news-of-his-
guilt-both based on his own words and information." Id. Ultimately, Navasky saw
The Nation decision as leaving the courts in "the news business for the foreseeable
future." Id.
" See 105 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)).
80 Id. at 2232.
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bly needed some of the verbatim quotations in order "adequately to
convey the facts.""1 Nevertheless, two additional observations led the
Court to weigh the second statutory factor against Navasky. First, the
Court found that Navasky did not use only those verbatim quotations
that might have been "so integral to the idea expressed as to be insepa-
rable from it," but went beyond that and appropriated "subjective de-
scriptions and portraits of public figures whose power lies in the au-
thor's individualized expression. ' 82 Second, and more importantly, the
Court relied heavily on a presumption that "the scope of fair use is
narrower with respect to unpublished works,"83 a notion that the Court
also discussed at length in a separate portion of the opinion."' The nar-
row fair use of an unpublished work served both to vindicate the statu-
tory monopoly of the author insofar as personal interest and commer-
cial exploitation are concerned and to protect the author's first
amendment right not to speak publicly."
In assessing a third factor, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used, the Court accepted the district court's finding that "'the
Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book.' "88 The Court
stated that "the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district judge's
evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking."8"
In referring to the "heart" of the book, the district court clearly
believed that any use of the information relating to Ford's pardon of
Nixon or to Nixon's resignation would have amounted to infringement,
because this material "was the very part for which Time was willing to
pay $25,000."88 Thus, in holding that the court of appeals erred in not
accepting the district court's evaluation, the Supreme Court indicated
that it was not troubled by the district court's analysis even though that
analysis was predicated on the view that the totality of fact and expres-
sion was protectible. Unlike the district court, however, the Court cited
instances of quotations by Navasky that constituted "among the most
powerful passages in those chapters."8 9 In light of the Court's general
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
" See id. at 2226-30. The Court, relying almost exclusively on statements in vari-
ous treatises, concluded that "it has never been seriously disputed" that the fair use
defense is severely limited when the work sought to be used is not published. Id. at
2226.
85 See id. at 2230. The right of first publication has by virtue of the Court's
opinion now been imbued with both a statutory and a constitutional aspect.
86 Id. at 2233 (quoting 557 F. Supp. at 1072).
87 Id.
" See 557 F. Supp. at 1072 & n.10.
89 105 S. Ct. at 2233.
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reluctance to act as a factfinder,90 it is unlikely that the Court was
making its own factual finding in addition to the district court's finding.
Rather, the Court appears to have attempted to reinforce the district
court's conclusion. This reading is consistent with the Court's own view
that in fair use analysis an appellate court can evaluate fair use as a
factual matter only if the trial court "has found facts sufficient to evalu-
ate each of the statutory factors." 91
The final portion of the fair use inquiry focused on the economic
effect of the use. Again, the Court adhered to the district court's finding
that The Nation's use caused Time to cancel its plan to publish the
excerpts. In the Court's view, the publishers had "established a prima
facie case of actual damage that [The Nation] failed to rebut.1
9 2
Navasky's article also infringed the publishers' right to create or license
derivative works based on the original. In this case, the derivative work
in question would have been a serialization of the memoirs.
The Court construed the Second Circuit's first amendment analy-
sis as requiring that the extant first amendment concerns in the dissem-
ination of information of public interest should widen the scope of fair
use.93 The Court rejected this analysis because it would, if accepted,
90 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275
(1949).
91 105 S. Ct. at 2231.
92 Id. at 2234. Again, the Court's reliance on the district court's finding at least
suggests that the Court accepted the district court's view that the totality of fact and
expression was protectible. The Court stated that "[a]ny publication of material from
chapters 1 and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment." Id. The Court
concluded that "once a copyrightholder establishes with reasonable probability the exis-
tence of a causal connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden
properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage would have occurred had there
been no taking of copyrighted expression." Id. The difficulty with the Court's position
is that although the agreement between Harper & Row and Time provided for renego-
tiation if any material on the Nixon resignation or pardon were printed before Time's
serialization, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit at C19-C20, The Nation, that provision established only a term
of the private licensing agreement, and was not sufficient to serve as the criterion to
determine whether any prepublication constituted infringement under the copyright
statute. Similarly, the Court's characterization of Navasky's use, based on the verbatim
quotations, as one that "commingles infringing and noninfringing elements," id., begs
the question whether Navasky's use was an infringement.
9' As was demonstrated earlier, this interpretation is incorrect. The Second Cir-
cuit relied on the first amendment concerns primarily to inform its understanding of the
issues of copyrightability, not fair use. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52 & 62-
67.
In addition, the Court attributed a first amendment argument to The Nation on
the basis of its assertions that the manner in which Ford expressed himself was as
newsworthy as the factual information. This assertion was made in the context of The
Nation's argument concerning the amount and substantiality of the material used. See
Brief for Appellant at 38-39, The Nation. The Nation argued that the case presented
no first amendment issue besides the one that informed the idea/expression distinction.
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"effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work
of a public figure." 4 The Court reasoned that first amendment interest
in dissemination is accommodated solely by the idea/expression dichot-
omy, which permits "'free communication of facts while still protecting
an author's expression.' "9 Further, Navasky did not "assert any ac-
tual necessity" for the use of Ford's expression." Finally, the Court
acknowledged that although copyright holders could not use their mo-
nopoly to suppress facts, the first amendment protected the right not to
speak publicly, especially when the copyrighted material involved had
not been published.
97
In dissent, justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Mar-
shall, argued that the copyright interest in promoting science and the
See id. at 41-45.
94 105 S. Ct. at 2229.
91 Id. (quoting The Nation, 723 F.2d at 203).
96 Id. at 2229. This contention is at odds with the Court's recognition that some of
the material used by Navasky was "arguably necessary adequately to convey the facts."
Id. at 2232.
97 A New York Times editorial characterized The Nation as a decision upholding
"the right of the reader to learn important public facts in timely fashion vs. the prop-
erty right of the writer to individual thought and expression." N.Y. Times, May 22,
1985, at A26, col. 1. The editorial stated further that the "Supreme Court upheld the
writer's right without infringing on that of the reader." Id. Such a conclusion seems to
be drawn from the perception that the decision was a narrow one that turned on the
question-"Did the magazine use too much of Gerald Ford's literary originality, too
many of his own words?"-and held that "authors, whether public figures or not, may
copyright their own way of saying things but not the facts they convey." Id.
The editorial also expressed concern that "[a]ll too frequently, persons in brief
authority hoard documents that are not their intellectual property" so that they may
"write history's first version." Id. The editorial noted that this practice is also an in-
fringement-perhaps not one of copyright, but of "public rights." See id.
One month later, Roger L. Zissu, counsel to Harper & Row, responded to the
New York Times' assertions. See N.Y. Times, June 22, 1985, at A26, col. 1. Zissu
contested the statement contrasting the right of the reader and the writer's property
right. He stated that copyright should not be seen merely as a property right that
conflicts with the public's access to information. Instead, "copyright works together
with the First Amendment in fostering the creation and dissemination of works that are
the source of important public information." Id.
Zissu also took issue with what he described as the suggestion that Ford hoarded
documents in order to write this history for the first time. He then asserted that "it was
undisputed that President Ford's memoirs were a series of recollections that were not
document-based," and that the documents referred to in the book were available prior
to its publication. Id.
Floyd Abrams, counsel for The Nation, responded to Zissu's letter, also on the
New York Times' editorial page. See N.Y. Times, July 3, 1985, at A20, col. 5. Abrams
pointed out that the dissent viewed the majority opinion "as permitting private monop-
olization of information at the expense of the robust public debate the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect." Id. He also noted "the willingness of book publishers,
who generally wrap themselves in the protective covering of the First Amendment, to
sacrifice the public interest . . . in return for a $12,500 recovery." Id. Abrams con-
cluded with a warning that "[b]ook publishers . . . should know better." Id.
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useful arts, and the first amendment interest in-broad-dissemination of
factual information, were both "ill served" by the majority's "con-
stricted reading of the fair use doctrine." '
B. The Basic Features of Copyright Law That Explain the
Divergent Approaches in The Nation
The obvious tension present among the different approaches taken
in these three opinions can be traced to uncertainty surrounding the
interpretation and application of various features of copyright doctrine
relevant to factual works. Each feature plays some role in one or more
of the opinions in The Nation.
One overriding concern that pervades this Article's examination of
copyright protection for factual works is that courts appear to treat the
doctrines of copyrightability, infringement, and fair use as interchange-
able doctrines that equally well "cut back upon the reach of the copy-
right monopoly in order that there can be social progress through the
expansion of the fund of human knowledge." ' In The Nation, al-
9S See 105 S. Ct. at 2240. The thrust of the dissent was that the majority wrongly
decided the fair use issue and wrongly ignored the copyrightability issue. The dissent
argued that the purpose and character of the article was "news" and was not affected
by commercial considerations, Navasky's intent to "scoop" Time magazine, or any bad
faith on Navasky's part. See id. at 2246-47. News articles are generally written for
profit; therefore, Navasky had the right to "scoop" the unprotectible information, and
thus could hardly be characterized as acting in bad faith in using minimal literal ex-
pression. See id.
Addressing the nature of the copyrighted work, the dissent again identified factors
militating in favor of fair use. See id. at 2248-50. A factual work is much more condu-
cive to productive use, and the fact that it is unpublished does not affect this aspect of
the nature of the factual work. Ford had no intention of keeping the memoirs confiden-
tial, and any other interest that he had that was protected by the right of first publica-
tion was an economic interest and should not affect fair use analysis of the nature of the
work.
With respect to the amount and substantiality of the infringed work, the dissent
pointed out that the majority relied on the district court finding, which was predicated
on the unacceptable "totality" analysis. See id. at 2251. The dissent acknowledged that
The Nation appropriated expression "among the most poignant in the Ford manu-
script," and that this weighed against Navasky more seriously than any other aspect of
the fair use analysis. See id. at 2253. The dissent, however, found it "difficult to say
that the use of the . . . quotations was gratuitous in relation to the news reporting
purpose." Id. at 2252.
Finally, the dissent maintained that the publishers had not proven any economic
detriment because it was possible that what actually caused Time to cancel its publica-
tion was Navasky's use of unprotectible information. See id. at 2252.
The dissent also discussed issues of copyrightability. Echoing the principle that
ideas and facts could not be copyrighted, the dissent went on to find that there was no
substantial tracking of Ford's expression in either language or structure of presentation
that would constitute infringement. See id. at 2253. As discussed later, this portion of
the dissent confused copyrightability and infringement issues.
" Gorman, supra note 3, at 596.
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though the district court and court of appeals relied on doctrines of
copyrightability and infringement in addition to fair use to reach their
respective results, the Supreme Court ostensibly sidestepped these issues
and based its decision solely on fair use considerations. The failure to
keep separate the doctrines of copyrightability, infringement, and fair
use means that the distinctly different concerns that underlie these vari-
ous copyright doctrines are blended into an incomprehensible
hodgepodge that makes it nearly impossible to understand what doctri-
nal considerations are at stake in any given case. x10
The doctrine of copyrightability delimits which works, or parts of
works, are eligible for copyright protection. Several issues of copyright-
ability arise in the examination of factual works. First, it is an axiom of
copyright law that copyright protection does not extend to facts. 1" This
prohibition, which is now embodied in the copyright statute,0 2 has its
origin in several sources. Copyright represents a temporaliyo3 and sub-
stantively 0 4 limited "utilitarian" right that is granted not as a recogni-
tion of any "natural right" of authors to the fruits of their intellectual
or artistic labors,10 5 but as an incentive to authors for the purpose of
100 For example, in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal
Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105,S. Ct. 100 (1984), the
court of appeals rested a portion of its fair use analysis on Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967), which involved an issue of copyrightability.
101 See, e.g., The Nation, 105 S. Ct. at 2229; Miller v. Universal City Studios,
650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d
972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Oxford Book Co. v. College
Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938).
102 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protec-
tion for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
1" Under the 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)), which became effective on January 1,
1978, copyright protection for works created on or after that date "endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a); see also id. § 303 (dealing with the duration of protection in works created
but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978); id. § 304 (dealing with the
duration of copyright for works in which copyright protection was originally obtained
under the prior statute). Under the prior statute, copyright protection endured for
"twenty-eight years from the date of first publication" with the possibility of an addi-
tional twenty-eight year term. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1982)).
1 The subject matter of copyright protection is limited by provisions contained in
17 U.S.C. §§ 102-105 (1982), and the exclusive rights granted by copyright are limited
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982).
'" In some European countries and in those countries that adhere to the Berne
Convention, there exists the doctrine of droit moral, or "moral rights," which embodies
the notion that artistic or literary works reflect the personality of the author and are
not granted merely as an incentive. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 8.21[A].
Some states have adopted various forms of these moral right notions. See Francione,
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promoting "the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts" 08 through the
production and dissemination of literary works. As Professor Nimmer
has noted, copyright protection "is granted for the very reason that it
may persuade authors to make their ideas freely accessible to the public
so that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of man-
kind.' 0 7 As a consequence of this goal ,of generating and providing
accessibility to ideas, the limited monopoly provided by copyright ex-
tends only to the expression of ideas, and not to the ideas themselves.'"
The concern for preventing a monopoly of ideas was extended
under early English case law to include facts and information. 9 Per-
mitting exclusive control over facts and information would disserve the
public interest that copyright was designed to promote as much as
would granting monopoly protection of the ideas contained in protected
expression. Further, the distinction between ideas or facts and expres-
sion reflects a concern that to grant copyright protection beyond expres-
sion would create a conflict with first amendment values. The Supreme
Court in The Nation explicitly recognized that the idea/expression dis-
The California Art Preservation Act and Federal Preemption by the 1976 Copyright
Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 105
(1984).
Professor Denicola argues that "[n]otions of a natural right to the fruits of one's
labor, and of the injustice of the enrichment that falls to the taker are as much a part of
copyright as the careful balancing of incentive and dissemination." Denicola, supra
note 22, at 519-20.
108 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, provides that "Congress shall have the
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."
107 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.03[A][1]. Not all scholars accept the
"incentive" rationale of copyright protection. Compare Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 285-86 (1970) (arguing that it is unlikely that an author's "re-
ward" guaranteed under copyright law is needed as an incentive or is more "just" than
the reward that would result without such protection) and Breyer, Copyright: A Re-
joinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1972) (maintaining that the "noneconomic benefits
of a copyright system . . . are in themselves insufficient to support the principle of
protection," and that the economic basis for copyright is unnecessary to "secure produc-
tion") with Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published
Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100, 1103 (1971) (arguing
that the present copyright system is a proven "system for ensuring both that authors
find it intellectually and financially profitable to write, and that the American publish-
ing industry is capable of producing a broad spectrum of book titles").
108 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). The idea/expression dis-
tinction is now embodied in the copyright statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), re-
printed supra note 102.
'09 See Matthewson v. Stockdale, 33 Eng. Rep. 103, 105 (Ch. 1806). In Matthew-
son, Lord Erskine stated that "no man can monopolize . . . the events of the world."
Id.; see also Triangle Publications v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 685 n.9 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) ("For the purposes of copyright infringement, data and ideas are treated as
equivalents.").
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tinction " 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression.' 110
The prohibition on copyright protection for facts is also related to
the constitutional and statutory requirement that copyright protection
extend only to original works of authorship."' The requirement of
originality is ostensibly not satisfied by the presentation of fact, nor
even by an interpretation of fact, which is itself at most a verifiable or
falsifiable hypothesis about a fact or set of facts, and which, if verified,
represents yet another fact or set of facts.
112
Although it is clear that copyright protection does not extend to
facts or ideas, but only to their expression, it is far from clear where to
draw the dividing line. The distinction between ideas and expression in
any case is difficult to determine, and, as Learned Hand observed, "no
principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying
the 'idea' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc.""$8 This difficulty is particularly troublesome
110 105 S. Ct. at 2229 (quoting The Nation, 723 F.2d at 203). For articles that
explore this issue in more depth, see infra note 148.
I The constitutional requirement finds its origin in the copyright clause, which
allows copyright protection to be extended to "Authors." See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8,
cI. 8. The Supreme Court has defined an "author" as "'he to whom anything owes its
origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.'" Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (quoting WORCESTER'S Ac-
ADEMIC DIarIONARY (1881)). The "originality" requirement "'means little more than
a prohibition of actual copying.'" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co.,
31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)). The 1976 Copyright Act provides that
"[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1982). The copyright statute also provides protection to derivative works, see
id. § 103, which are works "based upon one or more preexisting works." Id. § 101.
Some courts have held that the standard for the originality of derivative works is higher
than for ordinary works. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th
Cir. 1983).
11 See infra note 241.
n3 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960). In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), Judge Hand articulated the now famous "abstractions test"
for helping to draw the line between idea and expression:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its
title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of
his "ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Id. at 121.
Professor Chafee maintained that protectible expression covers the "pattern" of the
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when factual works are involved because there are considerable uncer-
tainties about what constitutes a "fact" and what constitutes "factual
expression."
The tension over how to apply this first axiom-that copyright
protection does not extend to facts-surfaces most clearly in the conflict
between the district court and court of appeals opinions in The Nation.
Although both courts asserted that facts are not copyrightable, the dis-
trict court retreated from that position in its view that noncopyrightable
facts contained in the memoirs received derivative copyright protection
by being merged into a copyrightable totality of facts and Ford's reflec-
tions and revelations about those facts."' 4 It was this totality that the
district court found to be infringed by the subsequent use. The Su-
preme Court attempted to sidestep this issue by focusing solely on the
verbatim quotations; nevertheless, the Court's attempt failed because its
analysis relied on the district court's findings, which incorporated the
totality approach adopted by that court.
A second axiom of copyrightability that has a direct and con-
founding impact on the analysis of factual works is that copyright pro-
tection may extend only to a "writing.11 15 Although some minimal "in-
tellectual labor" is required for a "writing,"' x copyright protection
work in terms of its "sequence of events and the development of the interplay of the
characters." Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright (pt. 1), 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 513-14 (1945).
114 For example, the district court in The Nation held that Ford's "revelations as
to his state of mind," 557 F. Supp. at 1073, were factual expressions, and thus copy-
rightable. See id. at 1072. The court of appeals reversed the trial court but did not
directly resolve the issue of the copyrightability of Ford's "revelations." See 723 F.2d at
204-05. Nevertheless, the court of appeals noted:
[T]hough it is true these responses did originate with Ford and might be
accurately described as his unique perspective, it seems to defy common
sense to declare that the "states of mind" which play a role in the crucial
political decisions of public officials are any less "fact" than any act which
such an official may choose or not choose to undertake.
Id. (footnote omitted).
115 See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The requirement of a "writing" has been
interpreted to include "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or
aesthetic labor." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). Congress has con-
sistently recognized the broad area in which it may act by amending the copyright
statute to extend to more categories of works. See id. at 562 n.17; see also Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 243 (1903) (upholding copyrightability of
circus poster illustration); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884) (upholding copyrightability of photograph).
"' The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). There is some confusion as
to how the requirement of "intellectual labor" relates to "originality" and "authors."
See supra note 111. In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court stated:
And while the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to
include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writ-
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extends only to works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression. '117
As a result, copyright protection cannot extend to the labor per s e that
goes into a work. 1 In the case of factual works, unlike that of fictional
works, the primary contribution of the author is the aggregation of data
that are subsequently compiled or arranged, or research that is eventu-
ally embodied in the nonfiction narrative, and not the protectible ex-
pression of the data or the research. Although protection of expression
in works of fiction may reasonably suffice to provide the incentive to
authors necessary for the production and dissemination of works of fic-
tion, protection of only bare expression in a nonfiction work appears to
provide insufficient incentives for production of the work in the first
instance.
As a result of this apparent deficiency in protection, some courts
have struggled to provide protection that is consistent with both the
constitutional protection of "writings" and the axiom that facts are per
se noncopyrightable, and also provides some protection for the labor
embodied in a nonfiction work. This protection has most frequently
taken the form of a requirement, injected at various points in an in-
ings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embod-
ied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.
100 U.S. at 94. The quotation suggests that originality may be linked to the require-
ment of intellectual labor. Professor Nimmer argues that
[i]t is important to distinguish between the requirement of originality and
the requirement of intellectual labor . . . .The doctrine of originality
stems from the Copyright Clause's use of the term "authors" and refers to
independent creation. Intellectual labor, on the other hand, suggests an
absolute standard, albeit a highly minimal one, of creativity.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 1.08[C][1]. At another point, Professor Nimmer
states that "[it is of only semantic significance whether originality is defined as embod-
ying such creativity or whether such creativity is regarded as a necessary adjunct to
originality. However, a greater clarity of expression is perhaps achieved by regarding
originality and creativity as separate elements." Id. § 2.01[B].
Professor Denicola argues that originality and intellectual labor should be re-
garded as different requirements. See Denicola, supra note 22, at 521-22. He states
that Professor Nimmer treats creativity as "part of the concept ...of originality." Id.
at 521 n.28. Although Professor Nimmer seems to present a "stronger" and "weaker"
theory of the separation of originality from intellectual labor, he does separate them.
It should also be noted that Professor Nimmer views the intellectual labor require-
ment, part of the concept of "writings," as providing an additional ground for the pro-
hibition on extending copyright to facts. See 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 73, at
§ 1.08[C][1].
117 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The Act also provides that a
"work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for
purposes of this title if a fixation of the'work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission." Id. § 101.
ll See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 3.04. But see Denicola, supra note 22,
at 530 (arguing that with nonfictional works "[t]he effort of authorship can be effec-
tively encouraged and rewarded only by linking the existence and extent of protection
to the total labor of production").
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fringement analysis, that a subsequent author of a nonfiction work en-
gage in some "independent research" in preparing the work. 19 For ex-
ample, in the dissent to the court of appeals opinion in The Nation,
Judge Meskill found The Nation's use of the Ford memoirs objectiona-
ble in part because it did not include original material in addition to its
reporting of the contents of the actual memoirs. 20 Justice Brennan's
dissent in The Nation noted that the majority's fair use analysis may
have reflected an attempt to compensate for the fruit of Ford's labor
reflected in his preparation of the memoirs. 2 '
Once copyrightability is established, the next issue is whether the
copyright was infringed by the subsequent use of the work. The stan-
dard for copyright infringement of factual works is unsettled. Gener-
ally, the plaintiff in an infringement action must show that the plaintiff
owns the copyright and that the defendant copied the work.'22 Because
direct evidence of the defendant's copying is rarely available, the plain-
tiff may show copying indirectly by proving that the defendant had ac-
cess to the plaintiff's work and that the defendant's work is substan-
tially similar in whole or part to the plaintiffs work.'23 A finding of
substantial similarity may be predicated only on similarities between
the defendant's work and the plaintiff's protectible expression. But if
the facts contained in factual works are themselves not protectible, then
it may be argued that the concept of "expression" in factual works
must in some sense be limited. 24 After all, two biographies of a histori-
cal figure are bound to be more similar than two novels expressing a
common theme. Further, although the determination of whether sub-
stantial similarity exists is generally an issue of fact, courts appear con-
1"9 See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, 378 F. Supp. 686,
690 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
120 See 723 F.2d at 213-14 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
121 See 105 S. Ct. at 2246 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d
87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
468 (2d Cir. 1946).
121 See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
124 Cf. Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Citations Fabrics Corp., 328 F. Supp. 554, 555
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that because the basic design for a textile pattern was not
original, the plaintiff was entitled to copyright protection only for what it had added to
the work); Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1960)
("[D]efendants are 'entitled to use, not only all that had gone before, but even the
plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the more general patterns; that
is, if they kept clear of its "expression." ' ") (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pic-
tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), quoted in
Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Generation Mills Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1971)).
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fused about the manner in which the unprotected status of facts should
be considered in making this determination. 125 Confusion concerning
this third feature of copyright law is illustrated by conflict between the
district court and court of appeals in The Nation on what constitutes
protectible "expression" when factual works are involved. The court of
appeals held that small variations in paraphrasing of factual material
could obviate a finding of infringement, 26 whereas the district court
viewed the paraphrasing as prohibited copying.
27
Finally, if there has been an infringement, the subsequent use may
nevertheless be protected as a "fair use." The fair use doctrine has been
characterized as "the most troublesome in the whole law of copy-
right," 28 and there are considerable difficulties involved in applying
the doctrine to factual works. Fair use, formerly a judicially created
doctrine and now embodied in the copyright statute,"2 is a "privilege
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the mo-
nopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." ' The application of
the doctrine of fair use to any particular case is completely dependent
on the facts and circumstances involved, and although there are specific
criteria that courts are directed to apply,1"1 courts often apply these
criteria inconsistently and incomprehensibly. In the context of factual
works, there is particular confusion as courts attempt to weigh as a fair
use factor the "public interest" involved in the dissemination of factual
works, or the "necessity" of a particular use-at least in part to accom-
modate first amendment concerns that arise when a copyright prohibits
the expression of a subsequent author.1 3 2 For example, the court of
appeals in The Nation held that interpretation of the fair use provision
required consideration of the first amendment concerns that have in-
formed fair use analysis.1 3 In reversing that decision, the Supreme
125 Compare Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-55 (2d
Cir.) (refusing to disqualify noncopyrightable elements from determination of substan-
tial similarity), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) with Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.) (affirming a grant of summary judgment because
all alleged substantial similarity was related to noncopyrightable elements in the plain-
tiff's work), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
126 See 723 F.2d at 203.
127 See 557 F. Supp. at 1073.
128 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13.
110 H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 125, at
260 (1944).
131 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13.
132 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
1I See 723 F.2d at 208.
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Court explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's inclusion of first amend-
ment considerations in the fair use context, and applied a much more
restricted fair use doctrine.""
II. TRUNCATION OF FAIR USE IN The Nation
Rather than addressing the difficult issues of copyrightability and
infringement of factual works, some courts1 3 5 and copyright scholars 3 6
have generally argued for broad protection of factual works and then
have sought to rely on the fair use doctrine as a means of resolving any
perceived difficulties caused by the tension that exists between the first
amendment and the copyright purpose of protecting an author's expres-
sion. In this section, I argue that even if fair use were ever a solution to
the problem raised by broad protection of factual works, the Supreme
Court's opinion in The Nation appears to have diminished significantly
the utility of that solution.
1 3 7
14 See 105 S. Ct. at 2229-35.
135 See, e.g., Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978) ("Conflicts between interests pro-
tected by the first amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been resolved by
application of the fair use doctrine.") (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F.
Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979)).
136 Professor Gorman argues that factual works should be copyrightable, and that
copyright protection can then be controlled through infringement and fair use. He
views infringement and fair use as largely interchangeable tools for balancing relevant
considerations, including the inseparability of fact and expression. See Gorman, supra
note 3, at 596. Insofar as the first amendment is concerned, Professor Gorman takes
issue with the position that any separate defense is necessary given the idea/expression
distinction and "the flexibility inherent in the fair use doctrine." Id. at 597.
Professor Denicola argues for copyright protection of collections of data and as-
semblages of facts, and finds no threat to copyright goals or the first amendment be-
cause "[e]ven more substantial takings [than those permitted under the substantial tak-
ing standard of infringement] may be permitted under the fair use doctrine." Denicola,
supra note 22, at 541.
Professor Ginsburg argues that the use of "factual interpretations and other fact-
dependent expression," Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 671, should not be evaluated at the
substantial similarity stage, but should be a part of the fair use inquiry. See id. at 670-
73.
137 In this section, I will address only those aspects of the Court's decision that
will most likely affect directly the fair use analysis of factual works, especially nonfic-
tion narratives. Nevertheless, one rather troublesome doctrine that affects all copyright-
able works and that does deserve some treatment is the Court's "presumption" in The
Nation against the fair use of unpublished works: "Under ordinary circumstances, the
author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression
will outweigh a claim of fair use." 105 S. Ct. at 2228. This truncation of fair use
protection for all authors represents a version of the "totality" approach in that the
analysis does not distinguish between those portions of the unpublished materials that
are copyrightable and those that are not. To the extent that all of the material is
presumed not to be subject to fair use, material that is per se noncopyrightable becomes
protected.
[Vol. 134:519
COPYRIGHT AND FACTUAL WORKS
The first way the Court has truncated the fair use doctrine as
applied to factual works results from the Court's collapsing of fair use,
copyrightability, and infringement issues. Because the Court did not
keep these three doctrines distinct in The Nation, it has opened the
door to excessive protection for factual works.138 For example, although
the Court purported not to address the legitimacy of the totality ap-
proach, the Court used the district court's findings in its fair use analy-
sis even though these findings were predicated on an explicit totality
approach. 9 In addition, the Court's fair use analysis confusingly
blended copyrightability, infringement, and fair use concerns.'40
The reason that a fair use analysis incorporating copyrightability
and infringement issues truncates protection for subsequent users of
Although the majority argued that this presumption is embodied in the common
law and scholarly commentary, the dissent correctly countered with the observation that
"[t]he common law did not set up the monolithic barrier to prepublication fair use that
the Court wishes it did." Id. at 2249 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There is simply no
substantial authority that supports the Court's presumption. Indeed, there is authority
to the contrary. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d
462, 466-67, 279 N.Y.S.2d 51, 57-58 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 29 A.D.2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d
568 (App. Div. 1967), affid on other grounds, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968). The Court correctly cited Professor Nimmer for the proposition
that "unpublished nature of a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily determinative,
factor'" tending to negate the defense of fair use. 105 S. Ct. at 2227-28 (quoting 3 M.
NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.05 n.2). However, the Court neglected to note Profes-
sor Nimmer's additional qualification that "the scope of the fair use doctrine is consid-
erably narrower with respect to unpublished works which are held confidential by their
copyright owners." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.05[A][2].
In addition, the Court's presumption ignores the issue of how to balance "the
exclusive rights of a copyright holder with the public's interest in dissemination of in-
formation affecting areas of universal concern," which is the function of the fair use
doctrine. Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). If, as the Court suggested by its presump-
tion, the copyright owner's unpublished work is deemed virtually immune from the
doctrine of fair use, the public interest is ignored, and the copyright holder's interest is
the only one considered.
Further, the Court's presumption is inconsistent with the copyright statute. The
copyright holder's exclusive right to distribute copies of the work, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) (1982), is explicitly made subject to the fair use provisions. See id. § 107
(1982), reprinted supra note 13. The Court referred to some inconclusive and ambigu-
ous legislative history and concluded that Congress intended only to restate in section
107 the common-law understanding of fair use, and that the common law recognized
the pivotal importance of the unpublished status of the work. See 105 S. Ct. at 2227.
Yet, inexplicably, the Court failed to recognize that at common law there was no abso-
lute rule about the fair use of unpublished work.
Finally, the 1976 Copyright Act provides that copyright protection begins at the
moment the work is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982). Congress has eliminated the importance of "publication." There is simply no
reason not to read the right of first distribution as governed by the fair use provision.
"I See infra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
1'3 See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
140 See infra text following note 271.
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factual works is that fair use analysis is an ad hoc procedure that "can-
not be determined by resort to any arbitrary rules or fixed criteria." 4"
Although the 1976 Copyright Act suggests criteria to be considered in
determining fair use,1 42 it is clear that Congress did not intend to alter
the doctrine's character as an "equitable rule of reason. '1 43 Determined
according to myriad criteria, fair'use is generally considered a question
of fact for which factfinders balance the equities subject to appellate
review under the "clearly erroneous" standard.""' The party seeking to
rely on the fair use doctrine "bears the burden of production and per-
suasion to show that the [defense] is applicable." '14 5 It is vitally impor-
tant that issues having to do with copyrightability and infringement are
not "balanced" in the context of the scheme of competing equities es-
tablished by the fair use doctrine.
The second truncation of the fair use doctrine in the Court's opin-
ion in The Nation occurs as a result of the Court's rejection of the fair
use analyses adopted in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House,
Inc.,148 and Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,147 both of which
incorporated first amendment concerns in the fair use context.1 48 In
141 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978), quoted in Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
142 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13.
148 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 (1984) (discuss-
ing the legislative history of the fair use provision).
'"" See, e.g., M.C.A., Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981); Triangle
Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980). In
The Nation, the Supreme Court characterized fair use as a mixed question of law and
fact on the basis of a footnote in a recent opinion. See 105 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing Pacific
& S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1867 (1985)). There is nothing in the Court's opinion in The Nation suggesting
that the Court viewed the standard of review as anything but the clearly erroneous
standard.
Even if the factfinder's demarcation between idea and expression is subject to de
novo appellate review, cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 1949 (1984) (libel case holding that a finding of actual malice was subject to
independent appellate review), a fair use determination would not necessarily be simi-
larly reviewable.
148 Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 151
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
148 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). For a fur-
ther discussion of Rosemont, see infra notes 148-51 & 163-64.
147 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
148 The "public interest" concern has been recognized to represent a first amend-
ment value component of fair use. See, e.g., Sobel, Copyright and the First Amend-
ment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971). The rela-
tionship between copyright and the first amendment has been explored in a number of
articles. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on
the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 283 (1979); Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment,. 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright
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Rosemont, the plaintiff claimed that its copyright in magazine articles
on the life of Howard Hughes was infringed by the defendant's book
on Hughes. In deciding whether the defendant's use of the copyrighted
material was accommodated by the fair use doctrine, the court an-
nounced that whether the doctrine "may justifiably be applied to par-
ticular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g.,
whether their distribution would serve the public interest in the free
dissemination of information." 49 Although Hughes could "hardly
qualify as a Horatio Alger hero in a 'From Rags to Riches' story,"'1 50
the court found that the "public interest" requirement predominated
over any damage to the copyright owner because to decide otherwise
would be to deprive the public "of an opportunity to become ac-
quainted with the life of a person endowed with extraordinary talents
who, by exercising these talents, made substantial contributions in the
fields to which he chose to devote his unique abilities." 15'
In the Second Circuit opinion in The Nation, the court relied ex-
plicitly on the public interest notion in Rosemont and applied a broad
fair use privilege to the verbatim quotations from Ford's memoirs. 52
The court concluded that in a case involving information about impor-
tant matters of state "[t]o decide otherwise would be to ignore those
values of free expression which have traditionally been accommodated
by the statute's 'fair use' provisions." ' 58
In Geis, the defendant author surreptitiously copied photographs
of the Kennedy assassination and then used sketches of those photo-
graphs in his book critical of the Warren Commission. In finding that
the defendant's use was privileged under the fair use doctrine, the court
held that "[t]here is a public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy.'
54
The "public interest" criterion of Rosemont and Geis is not explic-
itly listed as a fair use factor under the 1976 Act,' 55 and several com-
mentators have correctly identified this concern for the public interest
as reflective of first amendment values.' 56 Nevertheless, to the extent
that fair use was able to accommodate such values, the Court's decision
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L.
REv. 1180 (1970).
149 366 F.2d at 307.
150 Id. at 309.
151 Id.
152 See 723 F.2d at 207-08.
15 Id. at 208.
'" Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13. The criteria listed are,
of course, illustrative only.
158 See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 148; Sobel, supra note 148.
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in The Nation appears to have made that accommodation impossible.
The Court skated over the first amendment argument with a passing
nod to the idea/expression distinction and then, without mentioning the
concerns articulated in Rosemont and Geis, simply undercut these con-
cerns: "It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the
public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of copyright and in-
jures author and public alike."15 '
The "public interest" criterion was developed as a way to accom-
modate uses that could not be justified under confused and restrictive
standards of copyrightability and infringement. If there were legitimate
first amendment rights present in Rosemont and Geis, then those rights
should have been vindicated in the context of a finding of no infringe-
ment, and only as a last resort left to the uncertainties of fair use
balancing.
1 58
The Court was probably correct in declining to apply the public
interest criterion in the fair use context, but it was correct for a differ-
ent reason. Judicial determination of what is sufficiently worthy to
qualify as information whose dissemination will serve the public benefit
presents serious first amendment concerns that have led the Court, in
another context, to abandon forcing judges to determine whether speech
"involv[es] matters of public or general concern."'159 In any event, ad-
187 105 S. Ct. at 2230.
158 Several copyright scholars have argued for a limited first amendment privilege
in copyright doctrine based on the need of a subsequent author to use the expression in
order to convey an idea. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 148, at 306-13; Nimmer, supra
note 148, at 1196-200. These scholars appear to see this privilege as a separate defense
that could be invoked after the factfinder determines that an infringement has occurred
and that the infringement is not excused under traditional fair use criteria. If such a
privilege exists, however, it is because some appropriation of expression is necessary in
order to convey an idea. This rationale ostensibly indicates that the issue should be
resolved at the infringement stage as part of an inquiry concerning the idea/expression
distinction, which, the Supreme Court in The Nation correctly noted, "'strike[s] a defi-
nitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act."' 105 S. Ct. at
2229 (quoting The Nation, 723 F.2d at 203). If the first amendment defense is sepa-
rate, then a second idea/expression inquiry would be required to determine whether
the subsequent author's use of the prior author's expression was necessary to convey
freely the subsequent author's idea.
15' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(applying federal defamation standards in an action brought under state law because
the alleged defamatory statement concerned an individual's involvement in an event of
public or general interest). The approach taken by the plurality in Rosenbloom was
abandoned in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (doubting the
wisdom of forcing judges to determine "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment"). Most recently, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939 (1985), a plurality of the Supreme Court resurrected the relevance of "public
concern" to defamation. See id. at 2945-46.
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herents of the totality approach who have relied on Rosemont and Geis
to provide flexibility in fair use analysis must now look elsewhere.
The third truncation of fair use resulting from the Court's opinion
in The Nation involves the Court's taking the final step toward estab-
lishing a strong presumption against, and broad definition of, "com-
mercial use" in the fair use context.160 Although fair use has been ap-
plied historically to works involving commercial purpose or use,161
courts have taken the view that "any commercial use tends to cut
against a fair use defense. 1 0 2 Rosemont, in contrast, had relegated
commercial motive to irrelevance as long as the use involved the public
interest. The court of appeals had argued that "'[a]ll publications pre-
sumably are operated for profit' "13 and had concluded that "whether
an author or publisher has a commercial motive or writes in a popular
style is irielevant to a determination of whether a particular use of
copyrighted material in a work which offers some benefit to the public
constitutes fair use."1
1 6 4
160 Section 107(1) of the 1976 Copyright Act directs that the factfinder consider
"the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982), reprinted
supra note 13.
161 See, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957) (alleged infringement of copyright in books dealing
with Lincoln's death).
162 Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175
(5th Cir. 1980). Fair use has been denied when the infringing work had a purely
commercial purpose. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23
F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
161 Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (quoting Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Heath,
Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 483, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (Sup. Ct.), affld, 272 A.D. 759, 69
N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1947)).
16 Id.; see also Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that "hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not a signifi-
cant factor in this Circuit").
The erosion of Rosemont had begun well before the Supreme Court's decision in
The Nation. In Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978), the Second Circuit distinguished Rosemont as a case involving only
two direct quotations, and resting in part on the equitable consideration that the plain-
tiff was acting in bad faith. See id. at 1069. Meeropol was probably wrong on both
counts. Rosemont involved two direct quotations and substantial paraphrasing. See 366
F.2d at 306. In addition, the considerations of bad faith discussed in the concurring
opinion in Rosemont were expressly not part of the majority opinion. See id. at 305.
Although Meeropol acknowledged that commercial gain did not alone defeat a finding
of fair use, it stated that "it is relevant whether or not [the copyrighted materials] were
used primarily for scholarly, historical reasons, or predominantly for commercial ex-
ploitation." Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1069. Meeropol changed the focus from public in-
terest, where any purpose is irrelevant, to the primary purpose of the use. The Meero-
pol approach and its implicit rejection of Rosemont were accepted in a number of
subsequent cases, some of which purported to rest on Rosemont. See, e.g., M.C.A., Inc.
v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981); Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). Further, the focus began
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The Nation's presumption against commercial use clarified the
ways in which Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,16 5 rendered the
Term before, affected fair use analysis, especially the commercial pur-
pose or use aspect of that analysis. In Sony, the Court held that fair use
permitted the video recording of entire copyrighted television programs
for personal use. In that context, the Court held without discussion or
extensive citation that "[i]f the Betamax [videorecorder] were used to
make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use
would presumptively be unfair."'68 Sony involved a situation in which
users engaged in complete appropriation of the copyrighted programs
for no reason other than their own entertainment and convenience.'
67
Given that Sony cited the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act
to the effect that the commercial character of the use was a factor
" 'and should be weighed along with other factors in fair use deci-
sions,' ",168 the Court's "presumption" appears to be an effort to indi-
cate that even though it was taking the rather unprecedented step of
allowing an "ordinary use"' 69 to be a fair use, it would look very unfa-
vorably at "ordinary" uses that were also commercial.
In The Nation, the Court expanded on two aspects of the Sony
presumption. First, the Court indicated that, at least when the work
used was unpublished, its presumption against commercial purposes
applied not only when a "productive use"17 ° was involved, but also
even when the use-"news reporting"-was one explicitly mentioned
in the fair use statute as an example of fair use.' 71 Second, the Court
adopted the most severe rejection of Rosemont and Geis that had sur-
to shift from whether the case was primarily commercial to whether the user "stood to
gain at least indirect commercial benefit." Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affid, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
265 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
188 Id. at 449.
167 See id. at 421.
18 Id. at 449 n.32 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5679).
189 An "ordinary use" is the "'mere reproduction of a work in order to use it for
its intrinsic purpose.'" Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th
Cir. 1981) (quoting L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24
(1978)), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
170 A "productive use" means that "the copier himself is engaged in creating a
work of authorship whereby he adds his own original contribution to that which is
copied." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.05[A][1].
171 See 105 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note
13). Professor Latman states that "[niews reporting . . . has been traditionally granted
latitude .... It may well be that the interest in disseminating news suggests an ex-
panding scope of immunity . . . ." A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 208-09
(1979).
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faced in the lower courts: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material .... 172
Given that the Court rejected the public benefit criterion in its fair
use analysis as it concerned the first amendment, it comes as no sur-
prise that the Court would also reject the Rosemont/ Geis interpretation
of commercial purpose, which required an initial determination of
whether a public benefit existed. Nevertheless, the Court imported
from Sony what is perhaps the most severe form of the presumption
against commercial purposes, refusing to find "news reporting" a fair
use because Navasky stood to profit from his "exploitation" of the
memoirs. 17 3
As this analysis shows, the Supreme Court truncated significantly
the broad fair use doctrine that had been used to assure broad dissemi-
nation of factual works. The broad fair use doctrine obviated any ne-
cessity for courts and commentators to unravel the complexities in-
volved in copyrightability and infringement standards for factual works.
With the utility of fair use now diminished, it becomes necessary to
examine those standards.
III. THE "TOTALITY" APPROACH TO ANALYZING
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
Adherents of the totality approach argue that copyright protection
ought to extend to totalities of fact and expression. There are several
different strands of copyright doctrine that can be labeled "totality" ap-
proaches; each strand results in material that is per se noncopyrightable
receiving some measure of copyright protection as the result of "merg-
ing" with protectible elements. Much of the confusion obfuscating the
analysis of factual works by courts and commentators can be traced to a
failure to identify what theory was involved in the particular case. The
172 105 S. Ct. at 2231.
173 The Court may have used "exploitation" as a normative expression, and not as
a synonym for "appropriation." If so, then perhaps the Court did not intend to elimi-
nate evaluation of the purpose of the use in favor of the relatively simplistic determina-
tion, likely to be found in the overwhelming majority of cases, that the user "stands to
profit" from the use.
Although the Court agreed that Navasky's article was "news," the Court balanced
against this consideration the allegedly commercial purpose and the Court's view that
Navasky intentionally sought to "scoop" Time magazine by using a "purloined manu-
script." Id. at 2232. As the dissent correctly pointed out, such "scooping" constitutes
"standard journalistic practice," and the majority's reliance on Navasky's alleged bad
faith was unwarranted. Id. at 2248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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first totality approach defines protectible expression as including
noncopyrightable factual material for purposes of deciding whether a
subsequent use of copyrighted material is "substantially similar" to the
protected material. The second totality approach applies the standard of
infringement for works of fiction to claims of infringement of factual
works. The third totality approach protects the overall arrangement
and selection of facts in certain situations. All three approaches have
appeared in one form or another in modern copyright jurisprudence,
and all three approaches play some role in the various analyses used to
evaluate the plaintiff's infringement claim in The Nation.
The reason courts must begin to recognize the totality approach in
all its guises is that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in The
Nation, including the truncation of the fair use doctrine discussed in
the previous section, it is now imperative that the totality approach be
abandoned. The totality approach in any form fundamentally perverts
the goal of copyright law to promote science and the useful arts through
the production and dissemination of literary and artistic works. The
concern for public benefit reflected in this goal is particularly strong in
the case of factual works "because of the public benefit in encouraging
the development of [such works] and their public distribution, e.g., so
'that the world may not be deprived of improvements, or the progress of
the arts be retarded.' "'"' The totality approach threatens this concern
because it allows material that is noncopyrightable to achieve protected
status through combination with admittedly protected expression. It
simply makes no sense to recognize that certain material is not capable
of copyright protection because of "the basic purpose of copyright law,"
but then to allow the admittedly unprotectible material to receive
protection.
In addition, the totality approach exacerbates the conflict between
copyright law and the first amendment. Most commentators"'5 and
courts 7 6 have assumed that there is no conflict, because copyright law
protects only expression and leaves unimpeded the free flow of ideas
and because the fair use doctrine can accommodate first amendment
174 Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)
(quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 (K.B. 1801)), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967).
1" See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 148, at 289-93;.Nimmer, supra note 148, at
1189-93.
176 See, e.g., Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095,
1099-100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168-71 (9th
Cir. 1977).
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concerns. We have already seen, however, that the Supreme Court in
The Nation has limited the incorporation of first amendment concerns
in the fair use context. 177 Moreover, the more courts rely on the totality
approach, the less courts remain true to the balancing of interests un-
derlying the fact/expression distinction. The totality approach frus-
trates the first amendment interests of subsequent authors.
This section examines the three totality approaches. In separating
these approaches, I do not mean to suggest that they are not related
either conceptually or by virtue of their combined use in judicial analy-
sis. What does emerge, however, is that there are important differences
among the three approaches and that clarification of these differences
will ameliorate the tremendous confusion in the copyright analysis of
factual works.
A. Totality Analysis and the Subject Matter of
Infringement Analysis
The first and perhaps most common totality approach concerns the
subject matter to which the primary test of infringement will be ap-
plied. In order to decide whether the defendant has infringed the plain-
tiff's copyright, the factfinder must determine whether the works are
substantially similar to each other. The subject matter totality approach
allows a totality, consisting of noncopyrightable material and copyright-
able material from the copyrighted work, to be compared to the subse-
quent work for purposes of determining whether there is substantial
similarity between them. Alternatively, courts could employ an "exci-
sion" approach; that is, they could remove any noncopyrightable mate-
rial from consideration before applying the substantial similarity test.
These approaches have surfaced repeatedly in copyright cases involving
factual works, 1 7 fictional works,179 and even goods.180
177 See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (employing an excision approach).
179 Compare, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) with Reyher v. Children's Tele-
vision Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). In Shel-
don, the defendant movie producer claimed that there was no infringement of the
plaintiff's play in part because it was based on historical incidents and dramatic devices
that were in the public domain. See 81 F.2d at 53-54. In reversing the district court's
dismissal of the suit, the court of appeals adopted the totality view of copyrightable
subject matter: "We are to remember that it makes no difference how far [the plain-
tiff's] play was anticipated by works in the public demesne which the plaintiffs did not
use." Id. at 53. The court of appeals in Reyher affirmed the district court's dismissal of
a case in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed the copyright on a
children's storybook. See 533 F.2d at 89. The court specifically excluded a finding of
similarity based on scenes a faire, or "scenes which necessarily result from identical
situations." Id. at 92 (footnote omitted).
"I See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.
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In The Nation, the district court applied the subject matter totality
approach: it focused its analysis on the "totality of . . . facts and mem-
oranda collected together with Ford's reflections."'" The court of ap-
peals, on the other hand, concentrated only on the use of certain por-
tions of Ford's literal expression with "the uncopyrighted
material . . . stripped away."182 Finally, although the Supreme Court
ostensibly refused to address the issue, and purported to confine itself to
a fair use determination only, the Court appeared to sanction the sub-
ject matter totality approach in at least two respects. First, the Court
created a presumption against the fair use of unpublished material, and
failed to distinguish between those portions of unpublished material
that are copyrightable and those that are not.a8 3 Second, and more im-
portantly, the Court relied on the district court's findings in its own fair
use analysis even though those findings were explicitly premised on the
district court's totality approach.8
I will begin this section by examining an early case, Oxford Book
Co. v. College Entrance Book Co.,'"5 in which the court used both the
subject matter totality approach and the excision approach. I will then
show how the excision approach is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with
the traditional, though ambiguous, rule of Arnstein v. Porter.8 Am-
stein held that the ultimate determination of substantial similarity is to
be made by the trier of fact based on comparisons made without exci-
sion of noncopyrightable material.8 7 Nevertheless, I will argue that in
light of first amendment concerns as well as the basic purposes of copy-
right law, the excision approach is superior to the subject matter total-
1982). In Eden, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs
copyrights in two stuffed toy snowmen by also marketing a stuffed toy snowman. See
id. at 499. Although the district court upheld the validity of the plaintiff's copyrights,
the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
toys were not substantially similar. See id. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
it was necessary to separate those characteristics in the plaintiff's design that embodied
copyrightable expression from those that expressed a noncopyrightable idea. The court
of appeals then determined that there was no substantial similarity between the two
different expressions of the same idea of a toy snowman. See id. at 500-01. In dissent,
Judge Lumbard argued that the majority erred in its dissection approach, and that the
toys should have been compared and viewed as the "ordinary observer" would have
regarded them, that is, in their totality. See id. at 501.
11 557 F. Supp. at 1072.
182 723 F.2d at 206.
183 See 105 S. Ct. at 2223-28, 2232-33.
18 See id. at 2231-35, discussed supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
185 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
186 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
187 See id. at 468.
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ity approach represented by the traditional understanding of Arnstein.
1. Oxford: A Contrast in Approaches
In Oxford the defendants appealed the trial court's verdict that the
defendants' illustrated American history text infringed the copyright in
the plaintiff's illustrated history text. The plaintiff pointed to factual
errors in its text and illustrations that also appeared in the defendants'
work.188 The plaintiff then proffered these errors as conclusive evidence
that the defendants copied the work. The defendants admitted access to
the plaintiff's work, but also introduced evidence that they gathered
material on their own. 89
Relying on an earlier case that held that copyright does not give a
monopoly on the "contents" of a work, 90 the Oxford court reasoned
that although the common errors indicated that the defendants did
"use" the plaintiff's work, the defendants were free to use any informa-
tion or misinformation contained in the plaintiff's work because "his-
torical facts are not copyrightable per se nor are errors in fact. The
plaintiff's book was designed to convey information to the reader.
'" 1 91
Although the defendants could not "copy any substantial part of the
copyrighted work," but had to create "something distinctly their own,"
the court stressed that such independent creation did not "necessarily
mean something other than what has been 'put into words' in the copy-
righted work" because that would impermissibly grant to the plaintiff a
monopoly on the contents.1 92 Copyright protection permits the copy-
right proprietor only "'to make use of the corporeal object by means of
which the author has expressed himself.' "193 This limited copyright
protection was held to apply with particular force to works about the
same historical period because "[t]he subject matter is of necessity what
events have made it and the order of treatment whether that be chrono-
logical or topical is fixed by the facts."
194
Applying this framework of limited copyrightability to the alleged
infringement of the plaintiff's text, the court determined that even
though there were numerous places in the text where "substantially the
1'" See Oxford, 98 F.2d at 691.
189 See id.
190 See Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936)
(holding that independent reproduction of a copyrighted work could not constitute
infringement).
1:1 Oxford, 98 F.2d at 691.
192 Id.
193 Id. (quoting Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275(2d
Cir. 1936)).
194 Id.
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same thing on the same subject has been said in different words," the
similarity was "inevitable" given the nature of the works.'95 The court
made no attempt to determine whether the defendants' work closely
paraphrased the plaintiff's text. As to those patterns of the defendants'
work that contained expression identical to the plaintiff's, the court
concluded that the similarity was insufficient to establish infringement
because certain "phraseology . . .has . . .become more or less stere-
otyped in some respects in school histories."' 96
Although the limited copyrightability framework accommodated
the defendants' use of text, the court applied a completely different
framework to the defendants' illustrations, which in fact combined il-
lustration with verbal description. For example, the plaintiffs work
contained an illustration entitled "The Rise of the War Fever" that
depicted a thermometer in which the mercury had broken through the
top of the glass and the plaintiff had drawn separate lines along the
thermometer with dates and verbal descriptions of events leading to the
Civil War.197 The defendants used an illustration entitled "The Final
Blow" that depicted a man labeled "Sectionalism" hitting the plank of
a blow tester with a mallet labeled "Slavery." The blow tester had
"[s]ubstantially the same dates and events" as the plaintiff's thermome-
ter illustration."9 " The court, looking at the illustration and labeling as
a whole, concluded that "a substantial part of the copyrighted mode of
expression was copied."' The court affirmed the portion of the lower
court's decision that concerned the infringement of various
illustrations.0 °
The Oxford case represents an instance when a court applied what
was ostensibly the same test of infringement-substantial similarity-in
two different ways. First, in examining the text of the two works, the
court excised certain noncopyrightable portions of the plaintiff's
work-factual information, order, selection-and disregarded "stereo-
typed" phrases. The court then compared the plaintiff's remaining pro-
195 Id.
196 Id. On this point, the court was ambiguous. On the one hand, the court's
analysis suggests that identical language is insufficient to establish copying in all cases
when the language is part of stock phraseology. On the other hand, in light of the
defendants' admitted access to the plaintiff's work, the court may have been saying that
even if the defendants appropriated expression from the plaintiff, such appropriation
would be permissible if the appropriation represented stock phraseology.
'97 See id. at 693.
I" Id.
199 Id.
200 See id. at 693-94. Judge Manton dissented from the portion of the court's
opinion holding that the defendants' illustrations infringed the plaintiff's copyright. See
id. at 694.
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tectible "expression"-the actual words that the plaintiff had
used-with the defendants' work. In applying the infringement test to
the illustrations, however, the court appeared to look at the respective
illustrations as units, and to focus only on whether the similarity be-
tween the units was sufficient to show that the defendants copied the
plaintiff's illustration in making their own. If the court had not used
this totality approach, but rather had disregarded the similarity of dates
and events in the illustrations, the court would have found two different
illustrations of one noncopyrightable idea: the escalation of the events
leading to the Civil War.
2. The Traditional Test of "Substantial Similarity": The Totality
Approach Accepted and Resisted
The internal conflict in Oxford between the totality approach and
the excision approach is representative of the general uncertainty in
copyright law concerning how determinations of substantial similarity
are to be made and by whom. As discussed below, the excision ap-
proach does not fit comfortably within the contours of traditional copy-
right jurisprudence. The totality approach, however, conflicts with the
basic copyright principle prohibiting protection of facts. Moreover, at-
tempts to reconcile the two approaches have met with little success. The
result has been doctrinal confusion.
Although substantial similarity is generally a factual issue and the
"appropriate test . . .is whether an average lay observer would recog-
nize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work,"201 it is now fairly well accepted that this rather broad "audi-
ence" test is to be broken down into two stages, as articulated by Judge
Jerome Frank in Arnstein v. Porter.202 According to Arnstein, the first
stage of an infringement analysis requires that the factfinder determine
whether the defendant has copied the plaintiff's work. If the determina-
tion is based on circumstantial evidence rather than the defendant's ad-
mission of copying, the factfinder may, with or without expert testi-
20 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); accord,
e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1974). For a discussion of the unadorned "audience" test, see 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 73, at § 13.03[E][2].
202 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). For cases approving the Arnstein frame-
work, see, for example, Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.
1980); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 1977); Universal Athletic Sales v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.
1975); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967); see also 3 M. NiM-
MER, supra note 73, at § 13.03[E][3] (discussing Arnstein's modification of the "audi-
ence" test).
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mony, analyze or "dissect" the two works in order to decide whether
there is sufficient similarity to prove copying.03° In this first stage, the
factfinder must compare the two works without regard to whether the
similarity rests on protectible or unprotectible material.", In the second
stage, the factfinder must decide, without expert testimony or analytical
"dissection," whether the "defendant wrongfully appropriated some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff."" 5
Arnstein's second stage effectively results in a totality approach.
Arnstein viewed both copying and unlawful appropriation as issues of
fact, but at the second stage of analysis the factfinder is left completely
203 See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
I" See id. The reason for allowing comparison of the works without regard to
whether particular elements are protectible was stated by then District Judge Kaufman
in Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954):
If we assume that there is but one sentence of a plaintiff's work which is
both protected and material and the vast residue is unprotected, and the
claim is the copying of this one sentence by evasion, obviously a holding
which excludes a showing of identity or close similarity between the vast
unprotected residue of plaintiff's work and the bulk of a defendant's work
would eliminate any possibility of a finding of copying of the one protected
sentence.
Id. at 66 n.3.
205 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (footnote omitted). In Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), the court applied a
modified version of the Arnstein test. Under the approach adopted in Kroffi, the first
stage in determining whether there was infringement is the "extrinsic test," which re-
quires that the factfinder, with the aid of analytic dissection and expert testimony, de-
cide if there is substantial similarity between the ideas in the two works. See id. at
1164. If the factfinder concludes that there is idea similarity, then the factfinder must
decide, without the aid of analytic dissection and expert testimony, whether there is
substantial similarity of expression. This second-stage analysis is the "intrinsic test."
See id. Although the court in Kroffi noted that it "[believed] that the Arnstein court
was doing nearly the same thing" in the Arnstein two-stage process, id. at 1165 n.7,
the court claimed that its extrinsic/intrinsic test did "not resurrect the Arnstein ap-
proach." Id. The court in Kroffl seemed to recognize that only expression is protected
by copyright, see id. at 1163, but then held that in order for there to be infringement,
there must be "substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expressions
of those ideas as well." Id. at 1164. This notion of idea and expression similarity finds
no support in copyright law.
Moreover, Kroffi's extrinsic test is arguably inconsistent with Arnstein's first
stage. The Kroffl extrinsic test ostensibly requires that the factfinder determine
whether there is substantial similarity of ideas, while the first stage of the Arnstein test
requires that the factfinder determine whether there has been copying based on sub-
stantial similarity between the works taken in their entireties. Professor Nimmer has
concluded, therefore, that Krofft's extrinsic test appears to give the trier of fact a
greater role in the infringement decision than he understands to be the case under the
first stage of the Arnstein test. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.03[E][3].
Courts, in contrast, have generally not treated Arnstein and Kroffl as two different
tests; even the Ninth Circuit appears to have interpreted Kroffl as consistent with Pro-
fessor Nimmer's understanding of Arnstein. See, e.g., See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141,
143 (9th Cir. 1983).
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on her own to decide whether the appropriation is an unlawful appro-
priation. Expert testimony, as well as resolution of works into constitu-
ent parts, is not permitted.206 Even though Arnstein, relying on Ox-
ford, recognized the need for distinguishing permissible copying from
impermissible copying,20 7 it provided no guidance to the trier of fact
attempting to draw that distinction. Indeed, the Arnstein court empha-
sized that the "unlawful appropriation" inquiry is an "issue of fact
which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine" and that "even if there
were to be a trial before a judge, it would be desirable (although not
necessary) for him to summon an advisory jury on this question.
'20 8
Given the unadorned "lay observer" test as well as the Arnstein analy-
sis, a factfinder could not be expected to ignore factual material and the
sequence in which it is presented from consideration of substantial sim-
ilarity, because, at this second stage, there is no mechanism for the trier
of fact to distinguish copyrightable material from noncopyrightable
material.
Recognition of the need to draw a distinction between permissible
and impermissible copying has resulted in various judicial attempts to
circumvent Arnstein's de facto totality approach. There have been three
different responses to this problem. First, some courts have advocated
an initial determination of noncopyrightability based on a lack of origi-
nality and creativity. For example, in Amsterdam v. Triangle Publica-
tions, 209 the court denied copyright protection to the plaintiff's map,
which had been compiled from other maps but which alone contained
all of the collected information. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's
map lacked the requisite originality, in that the plaintiff had merely
collated the preexisting maps and added only "'an infinitesimal
amount of original information.' "2o
206 See id. at 468.
207 See id. at 472. The Arnstein court must have meant that in the second stage
the factfinder was to decide whether substantial similarity existed by referring only to
protectible expression rather than to the entire works. During the first stage, the
factfinder must determine on the basis of substantial similarity whether the defendant
has copied the plaintiff's work. The considerations of substantial similarity must be
different or else the copying determination would suffice to decide both issues. Given
that the Arnstein court spoke of "permissible" copying as the focus of the second stage,
it is most likely that the court intended similarity of protectible expression to be consid-
ered at this stage.
208 Id. at 473.
209 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951).
210 Id. at 106 (quoting Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, 93 F. Supp. 79, 82
(E.D. Pa. 1950), modified, 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951)). A similar case involving a
nonfactual work is Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
In Morrissey, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed a copyright in a set of
sweepstakes rules involving the contestants' social security numbers. The court held
that the subject matter involved was so narrow that it could be expressed only in a very
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The second response involves a judicial determination that sub-
stantial similarity between copyrightable works does not exist as a mat-
ter of law because all alleged similarities are to noncopyrightable mate-
rial. This approach, which allows courts to determine lack of
substantial similarity by summary judgment, evolved in an important
set of recent cases in the Southern District of New York-Fuld v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co.,211 Gardner v. Nizer,2"2 and Alexander vi.
limited number of ways. Moreover, "copyright does not extend to the subject matter at
all, and the plaintiff cannot complain even if his particular expression was deliberately
adopted." Id. at 679.
Morrissey reflects the doctrine of "functional inseparability." This doctrine holds
that "[w]hen the 'idea' and its 'expression' are . . . inseparable, . . . copying the 'ex-
pression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances
would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions
and limitations imposed by the patent law." Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971); accord Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1974). For a further discussion
of the relationship between functional inseparability and the totality approach, see in-
fra note 265.
211 390 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Fuld involved a claim that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in a script concerning the life of a famous gang-
ster by broadcasting a television movie focusing on the life of the gangster's girlfriend.
See id. at 878. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that there
was no relevant similarity between the works. For purposes of this motion, the defend-
ant conceded access to the plaintiff's script. See id.
The court assumed that the plaintiff's script was the only source of information
that the defendant possessed about the characters and events, but the court noted that
the facts contained in the plaintiff's script were also contained in other published
works. After reciting the contents of the script and movie versions, the court concluded
that "it is at once apparent that plaintiff can claim credit for much of the information
conveyed in the movie." Id. at 880-81. Nevertheless, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because there could be no copyright protection in histor-
ical fact, order of presentation of facts, or even in the selection of facts, "'although into
that selection may go the highest genius of authorship, for indeed, history depends
wholly upon a selection from the undifferentiated mass of recorded facts.'" Id. at 882
(quoting Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 Copyright Office Bull. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y.
1919) (L. Hand, J.)). In addition, the court relied on the related axiom that copyright
protection did not extend to "ideas, themes, locale or characters in . . . [the] copy-
righted work . . . [but only to] the means of expression of those ideas and themes-or
manner of use and development of those characters." Id. at 881. The defendant's treat-
ment of these noncopyrightable elements differed from the plaintiff's expression.
212 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Gardner, the plaintiff argued that the
defendants' book violated the plaintiff's copyright in a biography of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg. The court relied on copyrightability, infringement standards, and fair use to
enter summary judgment for the defendants. First, the court stated the axiom that facts
and events are not copyrightable. See id. at 942. For this proposition, however, the
Gardner court inexplicably cited a portion of Rosemont Enters. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), holding that for
fair use purposes it was "reasonable and customary" for subsequent authors to use
earlier historical and biographical works. See 391 F. Supp. at 942 (citing Rosemont,
366 F.2d at 307). The court could have cited the portion of Rosemont that did address
the issue of the copyrightability of factual information. See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 304,
306. Adding to this confusion, the court left unclear whether it disregarded similarity
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Haley2" 3-and was affirmed by the Second Circuit in Hoehling v. Uni-
versal City Studios. 214 These cases represent an adherence to the prin-
ciple that factual information, including arrangement and selection of
facts, is not copyrightable and the view that in cases involving factual
works a finding of substantial similarity for infringement purposes
must be predicated on appropriation of literal expression. What is par-
ticularly interesting is that the courts in these cases did not regard it as
necessary to have a trier of fact decide the issue of substantial similarity
or to decide what elements would be included in making such a
based on factual information because that information was not copyrightable or because
the court viewed as uncontradicted the defendants' assertions that the factual informa-
tion was gathered independently from common sources. Second, the court, relying on
Oxford, held that although the plaintiff's literal form of expression was protected, "the
copying must be even more substantial to constitute infringement when historical works
are involved." Gardner, 391 F. Supp. at 943-44. Third, the court held that even if the
defendants infringed the plaintiff's copyright, the infringement would be excused by the
public benefit referred to in Rosemont because any similarity was "not virtually com-
plete or verbatim." Id. at 944.
213 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Alexander evinced a much more careful use
of the standard governing summary judgment than did Fuld or Gardner. In Alexan-
der, the plaintiff claimed that his combined factual/fictional work on the history of
black slavery in the United States was infringed by the defendant's book, Roots. See id.
at 42. The court recognized that although the question of substantial similarity between
the works is one of fact, Gardner, Fuld, and other cases indicated that if the claimed
similarities were predicated on materials not protectible by copyright, then those simi-
larities could be disregarded as a matter of law. See id. at 44. The court then resolved
the plaintiff's claims into various categories of material, all of which the court held to
be noncopyrightable. These categories were (1) similarities based on fact, even if the
defendant learned those facts from the plaintiff's work; (2) similarities based on materi-
als traceable to common sources; (3) similarities based on scenes a faire or "incidents,
characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensible, or at least standard,
in the treatment of a given topic"; (4) similarities based on clichE language or meta-
phors; and (5) similarities based on theme or setting that are unprotectible as ideas. See
id. at 45-46.
214 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). In Hoehling, the court of appeals affirmed sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff, which had claimed that its copyright in a book
about the destruction of the Hindenburg dirigible was infringed by the defendants'
book and motion picture based on that book. The essential portion of the plaintiff's
book was the thesis that the Hindenburg had been sabotaged by a member of the crew
in order to impress a female acquaintance. The court acknowledged that although sub-
stantial similarity ordinarily presents an issue of fact, Alexander, Gardner, and Fuld
established that summary judgment is proper when "all alleged similarity relate[s] to
non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff's work." Id. at 977. The Hoehling court
then examined the similarities and concluded, as had the district court, that all were
predicated on noncopyrightable elements. See id. at 977-79. These similarities included
ones based on interpretation of an historical event, specific fact, and scenes a faire.
Although the court recognized that the line between idea and expression normally
presents an issue of fact, when the "idea" is historical interpretation there is
noncopyrightability as a matter of law. See id. at 980. The Hoehling court cited the
portion of Rosemont that concerned fair use, thus confusing copyrightability and fair
use. In doing so, the court committed the same error as the court in Gardner; as noted
above, the court could have cited the portion of Rosemont that addressed copyright-
ability. See supra note 212.
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determination. 1 5
The third response is typified by cases like Oxford, in which ap-
pellate courts engage in what is tantamount to a de novo determination
of the "unlawful appropriation" stage of Arnstein. Two recent exam-
ples of this approach have arisen in the Third Circuit. In Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,2" the district court found that the de-
fendant copied the plaintiff's work, but did not make the additional
finding required under Arnstein that the "copying went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation, the test being the response of the
ordinary lay person. 2 1 7 The appellate court noted that it would nor-
mally remand this factual issue to the district court, but because the
second stage of Arnstein required no determination of credibility, the
court held that it was "in as good a position to determine the question
as . . . the district court," '218 and concluded that the lay observer could
not find that there was substantial similarity of protected expression.
2 19
In Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc.,220
the appellate court affirmed the district court based on its finding that
there was no copying by the defendant; the court held in the alternative
that even if the district court erred in its finding of no copying, it
should be affirmed based on the second Arnstein factor: "[B]ased upon
our own observations and impressions, we conclude that while the ideas
are similar, the expressions are not." '221
The one thing that can be said about all three responses to the
factfinder's unaided responsibility to distinguish permissible copying
from impermissible copying is that even though none of these cases re-
pudiates or even questions Arnstein-indeed, two claim to apply Arn-
stein222 -it is difficult to reconcile any of the responses with the second
stage of Arnstein's infringement analysis. Although the factfinder may
"dissect" the works when deciding whether the copyrighted work was
copied, close analysis and expert testimony are supposedly "irrelevant"
in the second stage.22 The ultimate issue of infringement is one of fact,
215 For discussions of these cases, see supra notes 211-14.
216 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975).
217 Id. at 907.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 909.
220 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978).
221 Id. at 67.
222 See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980);
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
223 See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. A later court purporting to echo the Arnstein
bifurcated approach refused to allow the defendant to analyze the constituent parts of
the works in order to show that idea, not expression, was similar, and went so far as to
say, "Lest we fall prey to defendants' invitation to dissect the works, . . . we should
remember that it is the combination of many different elements which may command
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and must be decided in accordance with the impression of the lay audi-
ence. 224 This factual issue has consistently been treated under the
"clearly erroneous" standard for purposes of appellate review. 25
If the trier of fact is supposed to evaluate the combination of the
elements contained in factual works in their entireties, and is not to
dissect or analyze the works in order to decide whether the appropria-
tion is wrongful, the three judicial responses outlined above appear to
invade the factfinder's province. In Arnstein, the court did acknowledge
that treating the wrongful appropriation as an issue of law might be
permissible in certain limited circumstances, such as when "Ravel's
'Bolero' or Shostakovitch's 'Fifth Symphony' were alleged to infringe
'When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.' "226 This example, however, illustrates
that the factfinder might be excluded only when there is a clear absence
of similarity, not when the trier of fact could reasonably decide that the
defendant has wrongly appropriated a substantial portion of the combi-
nation of noncopyrightable and copyrightable elements that results in
copyright protection. When a court denies copyright protection ab ini-
tio, 227 or, more importantly, views the issue of wrongful appropriation
as a matter of law either in the context of a motion for summary judg-
ment or in its review of the factfinder's application of the second por-
tion of Arnstein, the result is judicial "dissection," an approach that the
Arnstein analysis seemingly forbids in the second stage.
This observation illustrates the difficulties with suggestions, put
forward by various copyright scholars, that factual works should be
deemed fully copyrightable to avoid their "unadorned appropria-
tion,' 228 and that unfettered access to factual information should then
copyright protection because of its particular subjective quality." Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977). This
refusal to permit close analysis and expert testimony reflects the standard "lay ob-
server" test for infringement that was adopted as the second stage in Arnstein.
A recent case that indicates the confusion inherent in the Arnstein two-pronged
approach is Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 12 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1634 (2d Cir.
Jan. 7, 1986).
224 Professor Nimmer notes that the unadorned audience test (before Arnstein)
"may not always prove an accurate guide to ferreting out the existence of literary
theft." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.03[E][2]. Acceptance of the Arnstein
analysis does not ameliorate this concern, because the ultimate issue of wrongful appro-
priation will be decided by the impression of the factfinder.
222 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); International Luggage Registry v. Avery Prods., 541
F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 603
(7th Cir. 1957).
226 154 F.2d at 473.
227 For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties involved when courts take the
approach that whole works are noncopyrightable ab initio, see Gorman, supra note 3.
228 Id. at 567.
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be guaranteed by applying traditional substantial similarity criteria.22
The difficulty with this argument is apparent: although the degree of
protection afforded to individual portions of the copyrighted whole is to
be decided under the traditional substantial similarity criteria, the stan-
dard Arnstein test simply does not allow an analysis of individual por-
tions to be made at the second, wrongful appropriation stage. If one of
the three "dissection" approaches outlined above is followed, the issue
of copyrightability will eventually be determined, but at a later stage of
the infringement analysis and in apparent violation of the traditional
rule.
The subject matter totality approach followed by the district court
in The Nation, then, is merely the result of following standard copy-
right infringement analysis. The district court refused to remove from
its consideration those portions of the memoirs that it acknowledged
were not per se copyrightable, but in determining the ambit of copy-
right protection, the court treated these noncopyrightable portions as
somehow merged with Ford's "reflections" and "revelations" about
these facts. The court of appeals removed from its consideration the
noncopyrightable elements, and, as stated earlier, the Supreme Court
purported not to address the issue but nevertheless based its fair use
analysis on district court findings that were predicated on the totality
approach.
23 0
3. The Need for a Narrower Role for Factfinders in
Infringement Determinations
The traditional Arnstein test for determining whether substantial
similarity between two factual works exists provides too broad a role
for factfinders, and therefore leaves subsequent authors insufficiently
protected. Arnstein allows the line between idea and expression to be
drawn by the factfinder subject to review only under the clearly errone-
ous standard. An ultimate determination of wrongful appropriation is
229 See, e.g., id. at 568-72; Denicola, supra note 22, at 527-32. This similarity in
approach does not mean that Professors Gorman and Denicola share the same views on
this issue. Professor Gorman argues for liberal copyrightability standards, but then ap-
plies various criteria to determine the scope of protection at the infringement and fair
use stages. See Gorman, supra note 3, at 568-72. Professor Denicola argues that copy-
right ought to extend to the aggregation and collection of data in compilations as well
as to the assemblage of facts appearing in nonfiction narratives. He would guard the
per se noncopyrightability of facts by applying ordinary infringement principles. See
Denicola, supra note 22, at 527-32. What Professor Denicola shares with Professor
Gorman is the view that copyrightability issues can be resolved at the infringement
stage.
"20 See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
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dependent on the factfinder's decision that substantial similarity exists
between protected expression in the original work and the correspond-
ing expression in the alleged infringing work. Under the Arnstein test,
however, there is no way for the factfinder to separate unprotected
ideas from protected expression. Consequently, the characterization of a
copyright defendant's speech will be an issue of fact in each case; un-
principled, ad hoc decisionmaking will result, as Judge Hand
warned.2 1 This difficulty precludes reliance on the idea/expression
distinction as a means of avoiding the conflict between copyright pro-
tection and the first amendment.
Although it makes sense to allow the factfinder to decide the issue
presented by the first stage of the Arnstein inquiry-whether the de-
fendant copied the plaintiff's work-permitting the factfinder to deter-
mine wrongful appropriation subject to the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review is somewhat peculiar in light of the first amendment
implications of this determination. In traditional first amendment juris-
prudence, "the limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unpro-
tected character of particular communications, have been determined by
the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been deemed to have
constitutional significance. ' 23 2 For instance, in Connick v. Myers,2 "3 the
Supreme Court held that whether an employee's speech was a matter
of "public concern" was an issue of law and therefore not subject to the
clearly erroneous standard.234 A similar observation may be made about
the characterization of speech as libelous,285 as constituting "fighting
words, 236 or even as being obscene.237 In Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc.,238 the Court determined that review-
ing what was ostensibly a purely historical fact about state of
mind-whether a libel defendant had actual malice-was an issue that
required the appellate court to perform a de novo review to determine
whether the record established actual malice with convincing clarity.239
Especially after Bose, there may be no justification for according
special treatment to the factfinder's determination that the defendant's
action constituted a prohibited use of protected expression rather than a
231 See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
22 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961-
62 (1984).
.33 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
4 See id. at 148 n.7.
2 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971).
2386 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 589, 592 (1969).
237 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
238 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
211 See id. at 1964-65, 1967.
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permitted use of unprotected ideas. In the event that such determina-
tions continue to receive "preferred" treatment, the only possible expla-
nation for such treatment is that the idea/expression distinction is elu-
sive and so must be made at least initially by a trier of fact. Even if the
characterization of the defendant's speech is a matter for the trier of
fact in the first instance, Bose suggests that the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of appellate review should not apply when first amendment issues
are involved.
Moreover, it is not clear that factfinders in cases involving factual
works should have to draw the line between idea and expression, even
initially. In cases involving fictional works, the idea/expression distinc-
tion is extremely difficult to draw and judicial dissection is almost im-
possible. Once judges perform the dissection, they have already made
essentially the same decision that triers of fact are being asked to
make.2 40 Thus, in cases involving fictional works there may be some
justification for allowing the factfinder to make the initial determina-
tion of wrongful appropriation. The same is not true for factual works.
With such works, judges are perfectly capable of stripping away the
noncopyrightable factual material so that there can be no combination
of unprotectible and protectible elements. The distinction between fact
and expression is simply different from the distinction between idea
and expression.2 41 Recognition of this difference in no way frus-
240 This problem is reflected in nebulous judicial and academic formulations, such
as Judge Hand's "abstractions test," see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), discussed supra note 113,
and Professor Chafee's "patterns test," see Chafee, supra note 113, at 513. Although
intended to facilitate drawing the distinction between unprotectible ideas and pro-
tectible expression, these "tests" do little more than restate the problem of distinguish-
ing idea from expression, thus providing no concrete standard to aid the factfinder in
what is essentially an "ad hoc" decision. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
241 Some copyright scholars have rejected the notion that facts and factual inter-
pretations are logically different from other types of works and have argued for an
expansive view of the meaning of "factual expression." See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note
22, at 650 (arguing that historical writing represents an author's particular perspective
"as shown through his synthesis of the components," which "is the hallmark of author-
ship, and the essence of expression"); see also Patry, supra note 22, at 633 (adopting
Ginsburg's view that a nonfiction writer is entitled to the protection of her narration of
the facts). Professor Ginsburg argues that the failure to protect historical facts and
theories rests on the "Platonic fact precept," according to which facts and theories have
the epistemological status of truth. See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 658. She rejects the
"objective" theory because historical writing does not reveal the "truth," but reveals
only "the author's perceptions and inclinations. If an historical 'truth' in the Platonic
sense exists, it can never be discovered, because the same diversity of understanding,
approach, and predilection which makes every personality unique precludes a unity of
historical interpretation." Id.
It is unclear whether Professor Ginsburg means to argue that the notion of factual
truth is meaningless, or that historical interpretation is on a different epistemological
[Vol. 134:519
COPYRIGHT AND FACTUAL WORKS
trates-and actually advances-the purposes of copyright law, and
reduces tension between copyright and the first amendment that might
otherwise be inevitable given the current theory of copyright infringe-
ment. The judicial responses to Arnstein outlined above may not fit
comfortably with Arnstein itself, but they serve far better the funda-
mental purposes of copyright law and the first amendment.
B. Totality Analysis and the Standard for Infringement of
Protectible Expression
Irrespective of how the subject matter of protectible expression is
determined, there will still remain a further issue: content must be
given to the "substantial similarity" standard of infringement for fac-
tual works.242 That is, even if the trier of fact is permitted to consider
only judicially defined expression, or the appellate court draws its own
line between idea and fact or expression, it will still be necessary to
determine whether the defendant's use has amounted to an infringe-
ment of the plaintiff's protectible expression, however defined. A court
may hold that the fact represented in an utterance is not copyrightable,
but that the expression of the fact is copyrightable. The court would
still have to determine whether a second utterance embodying the same
fact infringes the expression contained in the first utterance.
The traditional judicial and academic standards for determining
whether subsequent use of material beyond literal reproduction consti-
level from a bare historical fact. If Professor Ginsburg intends the former, then her
skepticism seems to be itself a "metaphysical" view that flies in the face of ordinary
language, a view that at least some "factual assertions" are epistemologically different
from other assertions. For example, most people would regard the assertion that "X
died in 1915" as being an assertion logically different from an assertion in a work of
fiction about a fictional character. Professor Ginsburg betrays even her own adherence
to some form of "objectivist" theory in her acknowledgment that facts are properly
placed beyond the scope of copyright. See id. at 664, 666.
If, on the other hand, Professor Ginsburg means that historical interpretations and
arguments should be regarded as epistemologically different from facts, then her argu-
ment is equally puzzling and her own views again contradictory. There is logically no
reason to treat an interpretation of a set of facts as different from a fact itself. A theory
about historical facts is based on either direct or circumstantial evidence. A statement of
fact may also be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence. In the context of an-
other argument, Professor Ginsburg acknowledges that if two historians offer two dif-
ferent interpretations of the same event, "[a]t least one of [the] interpretations must be
false." Id. at 660. If her argument is that an interpretation of facts, as distinguished
from the facts themselves, represents not "truth" but merely "the author's perceptions
and inclinations," id. at 658, it is difficult to reconcile this view with the view that
interpretations may be true or false.
242 Obviously, the character of this issue will vary considerably depending on
whether the protectible expression has been dissected by the court beforehand in order
to remove factual information.
568 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tutes infringement-such as Judge Hand's "abstractions test"243 or
Professor Chafee's "patterns test" 24 4-involve criteria that have been
developed for the most part in the context of assessing infringement
claims related to fictional works. These standards, which focus more on
the distinction between idea and expression and less on whether two
sets of expression are substantially similar, dictate that infringement
exists if there is only a minor variation between two sets of
expression.
2 4 5
Under the second version of the totality approach, a court deter-
mines whether expression has been infringed by applying a single stan-
dard of substantial similarity regardless of whether the expression at
issue is factual or fictional.2 46 Although there are differences in ap-
proach, the commentators are almost unanimous in their view that the
scope of protectible expression in factual works should be determined
by the standards applied to fictional works.2 4' The problem with this
243 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), discussed supra note 113.
244 See Chafee, supra note 113, at 513.
245 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); Chafee, supra note 113, at 513. The court's task under
an "abstractions" or "patterns" test is essentially to separate unprotectible ideas from
protectible expression. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 654
F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining Judge Hand's abstractions test).
246 Some commentators have argued that references to "wholesale usurpation" in
cases involving factual works, see, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d
972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980), are intended to provide a new
(and unacceptable) standard for determining the infringement of factual works. See,
e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 650-56; Gorman, supra note 3, at 593; Patry, supra
note 22, at 654 n.126. Although issues concerning the "wholesale usurpation" standard
are related to this second totality approach, they are sufficiently different to justify
separate treatment. See infra notes 282-366 and accompanying text.
A view related to the single-standard approach is that when a subsequent author
uses verbatim quotations from a copyrighted work, infringement is automatically estab-
lished, and the permissibility of the work must then be decided under the fair use
doctrine. See, e.g., The Nation, 105 S. Ct. at 2224. Any such assumption conflicts with
the notion that when there has been a verbatim use of protected material, the issue is
whether there has been a substantial taking of the material. Professor Nimmer labels
this issue "fragmented literal similarity." See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at
§ 13.03[A][2]. Professor Nimmer argues that although the issue of fragmented literal
similarity is often resolved under a fair use analysis, such a determination does not
make clear whether there is "an insubstantial similarity regardless of the defendant's
use, or ... [whether there is] substantial similarity which would constitute an in-
fringement but for the particular purpose." Id.
To the extent that the issue of substantial taking is resolved in the context of fair
use, which calls for the purely ad hoc balancing of many factors, this assumption repre-
sents another instance of totality analysis because it creates a dangerous potential for
according protection where resolution at the infringement stage would prohibit such
protection. See infra notes 270-81 and accompanying text.
247 See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 649-50, 666-73; Gorman, supra note 3, at
593; Patry, supra note 22, at 653-55. But see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at
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approach is that for logical and practical reasons the infringement stan-
dards for fictional and factual works must be different. It is not practi-
cal to apply the tests developed for fictional works to determine
whether there has been infringement of factual expression because
there will be many instances in which only minor variations will exist
between two sets of factual utterances, but a finding of infringement
would run contrary to basic copyright principles. Applying the inappo-
site standards for the infringement of works of fiction to works of fact
threatens unjustifiably to accord copyright protection to unprotectible
information. Such application thereby represents a totality analysis.
The tension between the competing standards for infringement of
protectible expression is typified by the lower court opinions in The
Nation. The district court considered Navasky's paraphrasing of Ford's
memoirs an infringement not excused by fair use. On the other hand,
the court of appeals rejected "the argument that paraphrasings of dis-
parate facts such as those found in [The Nation constituted] an in-
fringement of copyrightable material."24 Recognizing that there were
only so many ways in which the factual assertions in Ford's memoirs
could be expressed, the court of appeals permitted Navasky to para-
phrase these facts closely. The Supreme Court did not focus on the
paraphrasings, but stated that its fair use analysis of the verbatim quo-
tations "was not intended to endorse any particular rule of
copyrightability." '249
In this section, I will examine and reject the proposition that the
§ 13.03[A][11 ("[I]f the only original aspect of a work lies in its literal expression, then
only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to constitute an in-
fringing copy.").
Professor Gorman argues that "literary expression in . . .works [of history and
biography] should be entitled to no less protection than literary expression in works of
fancy (and arguably to even more protection)." Gorman, supra note 3, at 593. Further,
in the context of discussing copyright protection in maps, Professor Gorman asks,
"[H]ow does a court decide what is infringement and what is an allowable use when
the defendant borrows more than the discovered geographic facts but less than the
whole map configuration?" Id. at 568. He answers that
[a]s a matter of general theory, the problem is not significantly different
from determining whether the author of the motion picture "The Cohens
and The Kellys" copied merely the general theme of the successful play
"Abie's Irish Rose" or rather went too far and copied as well the plot
details and sequence of incidents.
Id. (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)). Professor Gorman argues that in the case of maps liberal
borrowing ought to be permitted, but he maintains that such use can be accommodated
under either infringement or fair use doctrines. Id. at 569-70.
248 723 F.2d at 203.
249 105 S. Ct. at 2233 n.8. But cf. id. at 2243-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Navasky's paraphrasing was not infringement).
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same standard of infringement should apply to both factual and fic-
tional expression. There are simply a limited number of ways in which
an unprotectible fact can be expressed; thus, if courts do not allow gen-
erous use of factual expression, they risk according protection to
noncopyrightable facts. In this context, I will consider and reject argu-
ments intended to show that there can be sufficient variation between
factual utterances so that it is permissible to apply the traditional stan-
dards of infringement applicable to fictional works. I will then discuss a
related problem involving a disturbing trend in copyright law toward
resolving the threshold issue of infringement in the completely inappro-
priate context of determining whether there has been a fair use-a doc-
trine that, when applied properly, assumes that there has been an in-
fringement. The point of this second discussion is to show that
sometimes courts and commentators recognize that factual expression is
different, but, rather than recognizing this difference at the infringe-
ment stage, leave consideration until the far more uncertain stage of
fair use. The problem with this approach is that in the fair use context
what is essentially an infringement question may be resolved incorrectly
in favor of according copyright protection because of the equitable as-
pects of the fair use doctrine.
1. Infringement and the Limitations of Factual Expression
An example of the limited number of ways in which facts can be
expressed may be helpful both for understanding the second form of
totality analysis and for distinguishing it from the totality approach dis-
cussed in the previous section. Assume that author X produces a copy-
righted history containing the following:
The end of the medieval papacy occurred in 1305 when the
cardinals elected Clement V, a Frenchman, to the papacy.
Clement V was regarded as an able intellectual, but was
timid, and was very subservient to the French throne.
Author Y, who admits using author X's work, produces a second his-
tory containing the following:
In 1305, Clement V was elected to the papacy. Clement V
was intellectually capable, but was also meek when it came
to dealing with the French throne. Clement V's lack of ag-
gression in a political sense can be said to have caused the
end of the medieval papacy.
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The second set of words is clearly a paraphrase of the first set.250
Even if the trier of fact believes that the facts contained in author X's
writing are per se noncopyrightable, the factfinder will still have to
determine whether the expression contained in the second work in-
fringes a copyright in the expression contained in the first. If the
factfinder applies the standard theory of infringement urged by the
commentators and applied by some courts, the minor changes in the
second are likely to be considered "immaterial variations. ' 251 The sec-
ond paragraph would probably be considered substantially similar to
the first under either the "abstractions test" or the "patterns test."1
252
To a very limited degree, the case law253 and Professor Nimmer
support the view that there should be a different standard for the in-
fringement of protectible expression when factual works are involved:
"[I]f the only original aspect of a work lies in its literal expression, then
only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to con-
stitute an infringing copy."' 255 Some courts have held that when a work
is based on material in the "public domain," the standard for infringe-
ment is not the same, and "small variations" in the subsequent work
may protect it from charges of infringement. 258 The difficulty with this
view is that ideas are also in the public domain, yet small variations in
the expression of ideas are insufficient to allow a subsequent user of the
ideas to escape liability for infringement. 57 The reason that a different
standard of infringement is required for factual works is not, as those
authorities maintain, that facts are in the public domain, but that there
are only a limited number of ways in which facts can be expressed.
One recent case that recognizes that this practical limitation re-
quires a different standard of infringement is Landsberg v. Scrabble
Crossword Game Players, Inc.2 58 In Landsberg, the plaintiff, "the ac-
knowledged Scrabble champion of Southern California," wrote a man-
250 At this point, I am referring only to paraphrasing of discrete facts.
251 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
252 See supra note 113.
252 See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 187 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25 See 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 73, at § 13.03[A][1].
255 Id.
25 See Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Generation Mills, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1030, 1032-
33 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Citation Fabrics Corp., 328 F. Supp.
554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
257 Although facts and ideas are both in the public domain, it is easier to identify
a fact than it is to distinguish an idea from its expression. The difficulty with this
argument is that it begs the question of how to define factual "expression."
258 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984).
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uscript on Scrabble strategy and sent it to Scrabble for evaluation.259
Scrabble reviewed the manuscript, found it to be excellent, and entered
into negotiations with Landsberg. The district court found that these
negotiations were in bad faith and calculated to delay for time so that
Scrabble could prepare its own strategy handbook based on Lands-
berg's manuscript.2 0 The district court also found that Scrabble had
kept copies of Landsberg's manuscript for its own purposes after
Landsberg demanded that Scrabble return or destroy its copy of the
manuscript, and that Scrabble had paraphrased a substantial part of
Landsberg's manuscript.
21
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's finding
of an infringement:
One consequence of the policy in favor of free use of
ideas is that the degree of substantial similarity required to
show infringement varies according to the type of work and
the ideas expressed in it. Some ideas can be expressed in
myriad ways, while others allow only a narrow range of ex-
pression. Fictional works generally fall into the first cate-
gory. The basic idea of a fictional work might be that classic,
boy meets girl. This idea can be expressed, as it has been
through thousands of years of literature, with infinite varia-
tions in setting, sequence of incident, and
characterization ...
Factual works are different. Subsequent authors wish-
ing to express the ideas contained in a factual work often can
choose from only a narrow range of expression.26 2
The court provided an example of this principle. Landsberg's
manuscript contained a statement that "[t]he poor player simply at-
tempts to make as many points as possible each turn. '26 3 The court
observed that given the limited number of ways in which the factual
idea could be expressed, "[j]ust about any subsequent expression of that
idea is likely to appear to be a substantially similar paraphrase of the
words with which Landsberg expressed the idea.
264
259 Id. at 486.
210 See id. at 487.
281 See id. Landsberg stated a cause of action under common-law copyright and
under the copyright statute, because the alleged infringements occurred at different
times. Although state law would apply to the former claim and federal law to the latter,
the district court held that this distinction could be disregarded because California ap-
peared to follow federal copyright cases on the issue of infringement. See id.
262 Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
263 Id.
264 Id.
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The holding in Landsberg reflects a general copyright doctrine
that when there is a merger or near merger of idea and expression, to
prohibit free use of the expression would be tantamount to granting a
monopoly on the use of the idea.265 Although the merger doctrine is
applicable to both factual and fictional works, it has particular rele-
vance to factual works because there are limited ways of expressing
265 It would be inaccurate to say that Landsberg is a completely unambiguous
instance of the merger of idea and expression. According to the merger doctrine, if a
merger of idea and expression existed, then Scrabble should have been able to use
Landsberg's expression verbatim. Although that issue was not presented in the case, see
id. at 487, dicta in the opinion suggest that the court believed that Scrabble could not
have used verbatim expression. See id. at 488-89.
There are five separate strands of the merger doctrine. The first is exemplified by
cases in which the expression and the idea are so inextricably interwoven that the idea
"dictates" the sole form of expression. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05
(1879); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971). The second strand is exemplified by cases in which the idea permits little varia-
tion in expression and there is some variation of actual expression between the two
works. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182,
184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944). In Crume, relied on in Beardsley,
the court insisted, "To hold that an idea, plan, method or art described in a copyright is
open to the public but that it can be used only by the employment of different words
and phrases which mean the same thing, borders on the preposterous." 140 F.2d at
184-85.
In the third strand of the merger doctrine, typified by Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967), the idea can be expressed in only a
limited number of ways and there is no variation of actual expression between the two
works. The fourth strand, to which Landsberg belongs, allows copying of scenes a
faire, expression that constitutes "'stock scenes or scenes that [flow] necessarily from
common unprotectable ideas,' . . . because to hold otherwise would give the first au-
thor a monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the scenes afaire." Landsberg, 736
F.2d at 489 (quoting See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also
Rehyer v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir.) (copyrighted
children's book not infringed by a magazine story containing a similar theme, in part
because "where a lost child is the protagonist, there is likely to be a reunion with
parents"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). The fifth strand involves copying of stere-
otyped phraseology. See, e.g., Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d
688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938).
William Patry argues that there is a difference between merger "that denies, ab
initio, copyright protection to a work and that type of merger that does not deny
copyrightability, but that operates as a limitation on the scope of protection." Patry,
supra note 22, at 652. Patry also claims that failure to distinguish between these two
types of merger results in the wrongful appropriation of protectible expression. Accord-
ing to Patry, any concern for the free use of ideas and access to information should be
accommodated by the noncopyrightability of facts and ideas and not by considering
merger in the infringement context. See id. at 652-53.
As a practical matter, however, Patry's distinction is irrelevant. Both types of
merger that Patry describes would be resolved at the infringement stage on the ground
that substantial similarity cannot be found if true merger exists. In particular, the type
of merger that denies copyrightability is considered at the infringement stage because
the prohibition on the copyrightability of ideas and fact contained in 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1982) is given effect at the infringement stage. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 73, at § 2.03[D].
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facts, which are per se noncopyrightable 66 The merger doctrine
strongly militates in favor of the position that when factual works are
involved courts should allow liberal use of expression and should forego
using infringement standards applicable to fictional works. Recognition
of the importance of the merger doctrine for factual works must be an
essential part of the standard of infringement in cases involving such
works.
It has been argued, however, that there are "stylistic variations
available for recounting most factual tales."26 This position presents at
least three difficulties, depending on how it is understood. First, if the
proposition is that the ideas contained in factual information can be
expressed in different ways, then the proposition fails to recognize that
facts, as well as ideas, are in the public domain. Although it is true that
the idea of the relationship between Clement V and the medieval pa-
pacy can be expressed in many ways, this idea is not the only thing in
the public domain-the actual or hypothesized facts concerning Clem-
ent V are also in the public domain. If one of these facts is that "Clem-
ent V was regarded as an able intellectual, but was timid, and was very
subservient to the French throne," then although the abstract
idea-Clement V's intellectual capability and character disposi-
tion-can be expressed in many ways, the fact that Clement V was
regarded as intellectually able but was timid cannot be conveyed by a
wide variety of expressions.
Second, if the proposition is that, at least with certain factual
works-most notably historical or biographical narrative-there are al-
ways different ways in which concrete factual assertions can be para-
phrased, then it would seem that the proposition exalts form over sub-
stance. The proposition acknowledges that the factual assertions and
not just the ideas are in the public domain, yet insists that the subse-
quent user vary the assertion within the strict logical limits imposed by
"' The copyright statute provides an ostensible exception to the "merger" rule for
a "compilation," defined as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preex-
isting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982); see also id. § 103 (limiting copyright protection in compilations "to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work"). In compilation cases, even though the idea and ex-
pression may merge-there are only so many ways to express a telephone direc-
tory-the resulting collection of facts is protectible. The extent of protection in such
cases, however, is uncertain. Compare Triangle Publications v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F.
Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that data in a horseracing chart could be used in a
subsequent compilation) with Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1937) (holding that a directory with sequential telephone numbers infringed the copy-
right in an existing alphabetical directory).
2617 Gorman, supra note 3, at 593.
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the nature of that information.
Third, if the proposition is understood as asserting that the bare
fact is in the public domain, but that the arguments or theories in sup-
port of this fact are not in the public domain,268 there is no logical
reason to draw such a line. For example, if the bare fact acknowledged
to be in the public domain is that Clement V was timid, and the histo-
rian's argument in support of that fact is that Clement V was sub-
servient to the French throne, there is no reason to maintain that the
premise-itself a factual assertion that gives rise to the conclusion about
Clement V's character-is protectible while the conclusion is not.
There are, of course, hypotheses like "Clement V's timid disposition
was caused by the economic and social conditions extant during his
childhood," whose truth or falsity will be difficult to determine. Never-
theless, even this type of assertion can, at least in theory, be proved or
disproved, and can have evidence marshalled for or against it.
The implication of applying the merger doctrine to factual works
is that the authors of such works may receive protection only against
exact or nearly exact copying, a consequence that may be difficult to
accept in the face of the admittedly considerable time, effort, and crea-
tivity that characterize the production of many factual works. Never-
theless, copyright law protects "writings" and cannot constitutionally
protect labor or effort divorced from those writings.269
2. Conflation of Infringement and Fair Use
Sometimes a court will recognize that idea or fact merges with
expression in that according protection to the expression is tantamount
to according protection to the unprotectible idea or fact contained in the
expression. Nevertheless, the court may find an infringement under the
traditional standard of substantial similarity, and fail to consider the
import of the merger of fact or idea with expression until it analyzes
whether there has been a fair use.
This approach, which some commentators support, 7 1 is unsound
for two reasons. First, the fair use doctrine generally assumes that there
would be an infringement absent the fair use privilege; however, if
there is a merger of idea or fact with expression, then use of the ex-
pression cannot constitute infringement, thus precluding the need to en-
28 See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 670; Patry, supra note 22, at 654-55.
269 See 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 73, at § 2.10[E]. But see Denicola, supra note
22, at 519-20.
270 See Denicola, supra note 22, at 541; Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 670-71;
Gorman, supra note 3, at 594; Patry, supra note 22, at 652.
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gage in fair use analysis. Second, this approach has distinct totality
overtones. If the merger is considered merely a factor in fair use analy-
sis, then even though the court may conclude that merger exists, it may
nevertheless find that there is no fair use as a result of the ad hoc
balancing of equitable factors, unrelated to infringement, required by
the fair use doctrine. A fair use decision against the defendant could
result in according copyright protection at the fair use stage to what
should have been declared unprotectible at the infringement stage. This
problem is exemplified by three recent cases, including the Supreme
Court's opinion in The Nation.
In deciding the fair use issue in The Nation, the Court reviewed
each statutory factor in assessing the verbatim quotations used by
Navasky. When the Court focused on the nature of the copyrighted
work it noted, "Some of the briefer quotes from the memoir are argua-
bly necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr. Ford's
characterization of the White House tapes as the 'smoking gun' is per-
haps so integral to the idea expressed as to be inseparable from it."
'2 71
Whether some of the briefer quotes presented a merger-type problem is
a secondary issue; what matters is that the Court assumed that it was
proper to analyze the issue of merger under the fair use rubric. If there
is a true merger of fact and expression, then the use of the merged
material, however similar to the original, cannot be an infringement
because the merged material is not copyrightable. But the Court as-
sumed that any use of the verbatim language, whether merged with
facts or not, would constitute infringement unless excused by fair use.
The Court examined the verbatim quotations under a fair use analysis
when the merged portions should never have gotten past the substan-
tial-taking portion of the infringement analysis.
A recent, Second Circuit case illustrates an interesting variation of
this form of the totality approach. In Eckes v. Card Prices Update,2
the plaintiffs spent a great amount of time preparing a guide containing
lists of baseball cards together with their going market prices. The de-
fendant published a monthly update of card prices and included a list-
ing very similar to the plaintiffs' listing of 5,000 "premium cards," in-
cluding certain errors that appeared in the plaintiffs' listing.2 73 The
district court held that although there were "marked similarit[ies]" be-
tween the two lists, these similarities may have derived from the fact
that the plaintiffs' list was so influential that it determined market
prices, so that "any subsequent publication accurately reflecting which
271 105 S. Ct. at 2232.
27 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
171 See id. at 861.
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cards are being traded at a premium would, of necessity, bear strong
similarities to the plaintiffs' work."'274 The court of appeals reversed,
holding, inter alia, that although there was no credible evidence in the
record showing that the plaintiffs' guide did in fact establish market
prices, any similarity based on such establishment "would best be ad-
vanced in a fair use context. '27 5 The difficulty with this position is that
if the plaintiffs' guide did establish the market price, then there could
be no difference between the idea of a guide listing market prices and
the expression of that idea in the plaintiffs' guide. In such a case, any
similarity between the plaintiffs' guide and a subsequent list would be
inevitable; there should be no need to venture beyond the infringement
stage into fair use.276
Eckes relied on an earlier case, Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,2 7 in which the court of appeals
held, in the context of a fair use analysis involving merger concerns,
that "[w]here an evaluation or description is being made, copying the
exact words may be the only valid way precisely to report the evalua-
tion." 278 The "evaluation or description" at issue in Consumers Union
was a factual assertion concerning the results of tests on a product con-
ducted by Consumers Union. Whether application of the merger con-
cern was appropriate in this context is irrelevant.27 9 What is clear,
274 Eckes v. Suffolk Collectables, 575 F. Supp. 459, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd,
736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
275 736 F.2d at 864.
2'78 In Eckes, the court rejected the argument that a baseball card price compila-
tion could not be copyrighted because copyright protection did not extend to the idea of
the compilation or to the facts contained therein. See id. at 862-63. Eckes involved a
nearly complete reproduction of a portion of the copyrighted compilation. Thus, the
court refused to "dissect" the compilation into protectible and unprotectible elements.
See id. To allow dissection in this or any other compilation case in which the idea and
structure of the compilation are dictated by the underlying substance would deny copy-
right protection to the compilation entirely, yet it is accepted that compilations deserve
some protection. See supra note 266. It is incorrect to conclude, however, that the ex-
ception for compilations "may also be significant for ...nonfiction narratives" be-
cause dissection "facilitates disregard of the subjectivity and creativity the author brings
to the combination of separately unprotectible elements." Ginsburg, Copyright Law:
Fact Works Revisited, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1984, at 22, col. 3.
277 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983).
278 Id. at 1049-50 (citing Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-
79 (1st Cir. 1967)).
279 It appears, nevertheless, that the court did apply the merger doctrine correctly.
There are a very limited number of ways in which the information that Consumers
Union provided about products can be expressed. For example, Consumers Union had
originally stated that "only one model, the check-rated Regina Power Team, was an
adequate substitute for a full-sized vacuum." 724 F.2d at 1047. It should be noted that
Consumers Union objected to any use of its name, as well as its information, in adver-
tising any product, and would probably have objected even if the defendant had not
quoted directly. See id. at 1046.
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however, is that if a factual assertion is so "integral to the idea ex-
pressed as to be inseparable from it," then any similarity based on that
assertion should be considered in making a determination of infringe-
ment. Accordingly, the issue should not be resolved at the fair use stage.
The merger theory reflects the notion that when idea and expres-
sion are inseparable, the subsequent user needs to be able to use the
expression in order to use the idea. Although the determination of
whether a merger exists should not depend on whether the factfinder
determines that the use is fair, fair use still plays some role when the
argument is made that use of another's expression is necessary to por-
tray an idea accurately. For instance, in writing a scholarly treatise on
photography, an author may need to use copyrighted photographs in
order to be "accurate." In this case, there is clearly infringement, and
fair use becomes the proper rubric under which to analyze whether the
use should be allowed. This "necessity," however, differs from the ne-
cessity involved in true merger situations. In the former, there is no
"merger" of idea and expression, merely the desire to use both together
in order to ensure accuracy.2 80 It is dangerous to consider editorial or
280 See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Professor Nimmer bases his limited first amendment de-
fense to copyright infringement on this type of "necessity," but unfortunately appears
to confuse it with true merger. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 1.10[C][2]; M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.05[C][2] (1984). A very similar view
is presented in Denicola, supra note 22, at 523-24. Under Professor Nimmer's thesis,
when the expression (as opposed to the idea) is necessary and meaningful to the demo-
cratic dialogue, then subsequent use would be permitted under a compulsory license.
See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 1.10[c][2]. The "necessity" invoked by Nimmer
is necessity for first amendment purposes, not for copyright purposes. For first amend-
ment purposes, expression may be needed to facilitate conveying an idea. On the other
hand, for copyright purposes the true merger of idea and expression necessitates deny-
ing copyright to an expression of an idea for fear of granting a monopoly on the idea.
This first amendment defense is limited by Professor Nimmer's acceptance of the first
amendment as protecting a self-governing people's participation in the marketplace of
ideas. A different first amendment theory might result in a much broader privilege
based on speech necessary to serve other first amendment concerns. See, e.g., Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978).
Professor Gorman also has confused the two types of necessity. In discussing
Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967), he comments that the court looked, inter alia, to whether the
preparation of the subsequent work "'require[d] some use of prior materials dealing
with the same subject matter.'" Gorman, supra note 3, at 597 (quoting Rosemont, 366
F.2d at 307). He concludes that this factor is no more than a restatement of the doc-
trine of merger of fact and expression. The "need" referred to in Rosemont, however,
was a first amendment consideration, not a "merger" consideration. The court was
concerned with a subsequent use needed to convey an idea, not a need to guard against
monopolization of the idea.
Professor Ginsburg argues that necessity should be considered at the fair use stage.
See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 670-72. The "necessity" to which she refers as a fair
use consideration is not necessity based on merger, but necessity based on accuracy or
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artistic "need" to use the original as presenting a true merger problem.
If, however, the idea or fact is logically or practically inseparable
from the factual expression, then it is appropriate to resolve the issue at
the infringement stage in favor of no substantial similarity, at least with
respect to that portion of the original expression that is merged. For
example, if the "evaluation or description" referred to in Consumers
Union was Jane Eyre's description of Mr. Rochester, then it would be
inaccurate to say that a true merger problem was presented; thus,
whether the use of the description constitutes infringement should
properly be determined under fair use. Conversely, if the "evaluation
or description" is a factual assertion-that Ford characterized the
White House tapes as the "smoking gun"-then a merger problem
may arise because Ford's utterance is at least arguably a fact that can-
not otherwise be expressed without the use of the verbatim language. In
this case, the problem should not be relegated to the uncertain balanc-
ing of fair use, but should be decided as a matter of law at the infringe-
ment stage. To do otherwise would permit factfinders to use the multi-
ple criteria of fair use inquiry to accord protection to essentially
unprotectible material. This excessive protection would frustrate a basic
goal of copyright law because "the risk of restraining the free flow of
information is more significant with informational work."'"
C. Totality Analysis and "Wholesale Usurpation" of Expression
The third version of totality analysis involves the extraordinarily
complex and confused notion in copyright jurisprudence that the de-
fendant may not engage in what is characterized as a "wholesale usur-
pation" or "bodily appropriation" of protected material. For example,
in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,28 2 the Second Circuit stated that
"'[t]here cannot be any such thing as copyright in the order of presen-
tation of the facts, nor, indeed, in their selection,' ,283 and absent
convenience. As an example of necessity, she cites Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which held that the merger doctrine of Morrissey
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967), did not apply to the defend-
ant's use of photographs of the Kennedy assassination, but that the public interest
weighed in favor of the use. See Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 671-72 (referring to Geis,
293 F. Supp. at 143, 146).
281 Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049.
282 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
283 Id. at 978 (quoting Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36 Copyright Office Bull.
478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (L. Hand, J.)). Professor Ginsburg has criticized the
Hoehling court's reliance on Myers on the ground that Judge Hand's statement was
dictum and that Judge Hand "indicated merely that conventional chronological organi-
zation was not subject to copyright." Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 653-54 (footnote
omitted). In contrast to "conventional chronological organization," Professor Ginsburg
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"wholesale usurpation of a prior author's expression," claims of in-
fringement for factual works should not be upheld."8 4 Copyright schol-
ars have criticized the doctrine of wholesale usurpation on the ground
that it unjustifiably serves as an alternative to the substantial similarity
standard of infringement; that is, under the doctrine a subsequent use
of a factual work constitutes infringement only if the use amounts to a
wholesale usurpation of the literal expression contained in the prior
work, not merely if the subsequent product is substantially similar to
the prior work.285
The traditional understanding of the wholesale usurpation doc-
trine criticized by the commentators is probably incorrect in that it ig-
nores the fact that the doctrine appears in at least three different ver-
sions. Moreover, none of these versions seems to imply that a
subsequent use of factual information can constitute infringement only
when the user engages in a wholesale appropriation of literal
expression.
Under the first version, a subsequent user may not engage in a
wholesale usurpation of the fruits of a prior author's research or la-
bor. 8 ' There is some confusion about whether all or only some of these
offers
an historian's choice and exploitation of setting or elucidation of
scenes . . . analogous to a playwright's development of dramatic struc-
ture. Thus, for example, to commence a history of World War I at the
1910 funeral of Edward VII, thereby capturing the old socio-political or-
der, and highlighting the ominousness of German expansionism, demon-
strates an evocation and an artistry warranting copyright protection.
Id. at 649 (footnote omitted).
Two responses to Professor Ginsburg's argument are in order. First, Professor
Ginsburg fails to recognize that Judge Hand in Myers explicitly acknowledged that
selection of facts is not protectible "although into that. selection may go the highest
genius of authorship, for indeed, history depends wholly upon a selection from the
undifferentiated mass of recorded facts." 36 Copyright Office Bull. at 479. Surely,
Judge Hand's statement covers the historian's decision to begin the history at the fu-
neral of Edward VII, a decision that may reflect great genius on the part of the histo-
rian after sifting through the undifferentiated mass of facts possibly relevant to World
War I. The point is that it is incorrect to think that Judge Hand was speaking only
about chronological rather than "socio-political" or other histories.
Second, in focusing on Myers, Professor Ginsburg neglects other cases that support
the Hoehling court. See, e.g., Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d
688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938) (arguing that with respect to historical works "[t]he subject
matter is of necessity what events have made it and the order of treatment whether that
be chronological or topical is fixed by the facts") (emphasis added); Fuld v. National
Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (asserting that historical
facts are in the public domain and available to any writer who wishes to use them).
28 See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 980.
285 See Denicola, supra note 22, at 539; Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 648;
Gorman, supra note 3, at 593.
288 See infra notes 289-312 and accompanying text.
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fruits must be appropriated before the taking becomes infringement.
Protection of labor and research clearly represents a totality analysis
because such protection is tantamount to according copyright protection
to the facts discovered as a result of the research or labor.
According to the second version, there can be no fair use of a fac-
tual work if the use constitutes a wholesale usurpation. 217 In this in-
stance, the doctrine is not one that establishes a standard for infringe-
ment, but one that becomes relevant only after infringement has been
established. This second version of the doctrine may also constitute to-
tality analysis if courts use it to accord broad copyright protection to
factual material and then "compensate" by substituting the wholesale
usurpation standard as a fair use factor.
The third version of the doctrine involves essentially an additional
type of protectible expression reflected in the total structure and ar-
rangement of the work, distinct from the literal expression contained in
the work.288 This version of the wholesale usurpation doctrine also
raises totality concerns; if disparate facts can be paraphrased, but total
structure and arrangement-the "mosaic"-cannot be imitated, then
collections of noncopyrightable facts may receive some level of copyright
protection.
It is, of course, somewhat artificial to present these versions as
completely or clearly distinct. If such designations could be made so
readily, there would not be as much confusion in the cases and aca-
demic comment concerning the wholesale usurpation doctrine. This
confusion has been manifested not so much in disagreement among dif-
ferent courts-indeed, most of these cases have arisen in the Second
Circuit-as in instances in which different versions of the doctrine have
been confused within the same opinion, or in which one version has
been discredited only to reappear later under a different characteriza-
tion. Understanding the doctrine of wholesale usurpation and the rela-'
tionship of the doctrine to totality analysis requires a rather tortuous
journey through a number of cases that have, for the most part, been
neglected as paradigms for the doctrine. In this portion of the Article, I
analyze the development of each version of the doctrine, contrasting in
particular my position with Professor Denicola's. I conclude that the
first two versions of the doctrine seriously conflict with the basic pur-
poses of copyright law. The third version, articulated by the court of
appeals in The Nation, presents a closer question.
287 See infra notes 313-44 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 345-66 and accompanying text.
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1. Wholesale Usurpation of Research or Labor
The first version of the wholesale usurpation doctrine is that there
may be no wholesale usurpation of the "fruits of labor" of a prior au-
thor. If this version of the doctrine is understood to prohibit use of an
author's research, then the doctrine is clearly a totality approach, be-
cause protection of research or labor is tantamount to protecting the
facts found by that research or labor. The contours of this version of
the doctrine are established by several cases.
In Huie v. National Broadcasting Co.,2 89 defendant Meree Miller
read the plaintiff's story, entitled The Hero of Iwo Jima, concerning the
tragic life of one of the marines in the staged photograph of the raising
of the American flag on Mt. Suribachi. He then prepared a television
script similar to the plaintiff's story. The plaintiff filed an action
against Miller and a number of other defendants, seeking a preliminary
injunction against broadcast of the film based on the script. The court
recognized the historical nature of the work, but argued that this char-
acteristic was not dispositive:
For example, if an historian had published a history of the
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States
with respect to nuclear explosions and copyrighted it, it
would be an infringement of the copyright for another histo-
rian to publish a history re-written from the first historian's
book without any independent research. The stock example
is the city directory which publishes nothing but facts but
which cannot be copied without infringing its copyright. The
second historian or second directory publisher cannot bodily
appropriate the research of his predecessor."'0
The court noted that Miller had used certain fictional episodes in
the plaintiff's work without conducting independent research, but held
that this behavior was insufficient to show that he had "bodily appro-
priated" the plaintiff's research.291 The court stated that "[t]he deter-
mining question must be . . . whether defendant Miller has appropri-
ated plaintiff's literary treatment of 'historical' facts." 9' This question
presumably focused on whether Miller had unlawfully appropriated
the plaintiff's protectible expression.
The court held that although there was no allegation that Miller
184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
290 Id. at 200.
"*' See id.
292 Id.
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had copied from the plaintiff in a "slavish" manner, an inquiry into
appropriation of expression included determining whether the plain-
tiff's literary treatment "was of such originality that [the court] must
say that defendants' treatment of the* same subject was inspired by
it."'2 93 Miller had considered preparing the television script before he
saw the plaintiff's story, and once he had the historical data, the theme
that he followed was said to be "almost inevitable."29
Huie is a curious case. There was no doubt that Miller "copied"
the plaintiffs work. He acknowledged that he read the plaintiffs story,
and the court noted that he had removed, on the plaintiff's request, "a
number of verbal similarities" from the penultimate version of the tele-
vision script. 95 Further, the plaintiff's fictional episodes embedded in
the biographical account were evident in Miller's work. The court
could have relied on Oxford and held, as the defendants urged, that any
similarity between the works based on information in the public do-
main (including "misinformation" masquerading as historical fact) was
not a basis for finding infringement. Instead, the court viewed the
noncopyrightability of fact as relevant only after it examined the works
to see whether Miller had "bodily appropriated" the plaintiff's research
without conducting independent research.296 This inquiry was con-
fused, however, because the court recognized that Miller had not con-
ducted independent research in appropriating the "fictional" elements
of the plaintiff's work. This analysis suggests strongly that the court
would have found the required appropriation only if all or substantially
all of the first work had been taken by the second author.
2 97
Once the court determined that there had been no "bodily appro-
priation," it turned to the issue of appropriation of expression, which
involved a two-pronged inquiry into whether the expression was "slav-
ishly" copied and whether it was so original that it "inspired" the de-
fendants' version.29 8 Here, the court seemed to recognize the Oxford
principle that when a work focuses on historical facts, similarities in
the treatment of the same event or set of events by the two authors are
inevitable and cannot form the basis for a finding of copyright
infringement.
The strict bodily appropriation standard of Huie was relaxed sig-
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 See id. at 199.
298 See id. at 200.
297 Indeed, the court noted that the case was different from its example of a book
describing the history of nuclear weapons negotiations. In that example, "all of the
facts" were copied when the court found "bodily appropriation." See id.
298 See id.
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nificantly by Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co.,299 in which the court of
appeals affirmed a finding of infringement by the same judge who de-
cided Huie. In Orgel, the defendant published a law treatise on emi-
nent domain valuation and procedure. The district court determined
that approximately thirty-five percent of the defendant's treatise in-
fringed the plaintiff's treatise, although it did not indicate the percent-
age of the plaintiffs work that the defendant appropriated.300 The
court of appeals, in affirming the district court's finding of infringe-
ment, held that the defendant had "lifted" the essence of the plaintiffs
work: although he added additional material and went beyond the
plaintiff's work, he adopted the plaintiff's "analysis, organization of
material, phrasing and citations without any credit to" the plaintiff.301
The court recognized that although two treatises on the same legal sub-
ject were bound to be similar because of stock phraseology and common
sources, this inevitable "innocent similarity" was exceeded by the de-
fendant's "colorable variation" of the plaintiff's work. 0 2 The court con-
cluded by stating that "[a]ppropriation of the fruits of another's labor
and skill in order to publish a rival work without the expenditure of
the time and effort required for independently arrived at results is
copyright infringement."
SO3
Orgel neglected entirely any determination of whether the similar-
ity between the works was predicated on noncopyrightable information.
Rather, the court based its finding of unlawful appropriation on a com-
parison of the complete texts.30" In addition, the court did not use the
same standard for "bodily appropriation" as did the district court in
Huie. In Huie, the court suggested that "bodily appropriation" meant
that the defendant would have to appropriate all or substantially all of
the plaintiff's work. In Orgel, the court relied exclusively on a determi-
nation of whether the defendant had appropriated the "fruits of [the
plaintiff's] labor" without independent research.30 5 Related to the
299 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962).
300 See id. at 122. A comparison of the two works at issue suggests that the de-
fendant appropriated only selected portions of the plaintiff's treatise. Compare A.
JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1953) with L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1936).
301 Orgel, 301 F.2d at 120.
302 Id. (footnote omitted).
303 Id. (footnote omitted). As support for this proposition, the court cited an ear-
lier case that dealt not with the copyrightability of factual information, but with the
fair use of syllabuses accompanying reported law cases. See id. (citing West Publishing
Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910)). Even in West, the court
suggested that different types of factual works would receive different levels of protec-
tion under the fair use doctrine. See West, 176 F. at 838.
304 See Orgel, 301 F.2d at 120.
305 See id.
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court's neglect of copyrightability analysis and its expanded view of
"bodily appropriation" based on appropriation of the fruits of labor
was the court's assumption that the "innocent similarity" that would
inevitably exist between two factual works dealing with the same sub-
ject matter could not exceed the level of similarity that would result
from the independent use of common phraseology and sources. Similar-
ity that would inevitably result from the defendant's use of the
noncopyrightable portions of the plaintiff's work was not considered.
30 6
Although Huie and Orgel differ in the amount of wholesale usur-
pation necessary to establish a copyright infringement, it is clear that
both cases rest on the theory that a subsequent author may not appro-
priate the fruits of a prior author's labor without independent re-
search.17 Neither case, however, reflects the clear trend of judicial de-
30 With regard to "innocent similarity" the court cited Chautauqua School of
Nursing v. National School of Nursing, 238 F. 151 (2d Cir. 1916). In Chautauqua,
the plaintiff alleged that the copyright in its photograph-illustrated publication dealing
with the administration of hypodermic injection was infringed by the defendant's publi-
cation dealing with the same subject. The court conceded that the plaintiff was the first
to produce a text in which hypodermic injection was divided into the 12 successive
stages generally practiced in medicine, as well as the first to illustrate each stage with a
photograph. See id. at 152. The court ruled, however, that the plaintiff "had no mo-
nopoly of the things taught in its [text], because they were the common teaching." Id.
at 153. The author of the defendant's publication, a physician, "had a right to consult
all previous publications on the subject ...and to state in his own language what he
thought to be the proper and the best practice." Id. The court analogized the work in
question to a directory, a dictionary, a guide for railroad trains, and a guide for auto-
mobile trips. The court also cited a treatise arguing that the requirement of originality
in copyright law demanded only that the subsequent author "'be the producer of that
for which he claims protection,"' id. (quoting E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES 205 (1879)), to support its ruling that "[iun such cases the question is
whether the writer has availed himself of the earlier writer's work without doing any
independent work himself." Id. The court also held that the defendant's photographs
did not infringe the plaintiff's copyright in the photographs because the defendant took
his own pictures of the procedures and did not reproduce the plaintiff's photographs.
See id. at 152.
The point here is that although the court imposed the requirement that the de-
fendant engage in "independent work," it is clear from the opinion that all that was
required was that the defendant did not copy the plaintiff's work so as to preclude a
finding of originality in the second work. That is, if the defendant had read the plain-
tiff's work and no other, and had stated his own conclusions in his own language, then
the defendant's text would be an independent work.
307 As explained in the section concerning the second version of the wholesale
usurpation doctrine, the labor theory of copyright resurfaced in modified form in Wain-
wright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1014 (1978). See infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text. This fact is
somewhat puzzling in light of the earlier rejection of the theory by the same court in
Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). Rosemont had
rejected the theory as it was embodied in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d
664 (7th Cir. 1950). See 366 F.2d at 310. The court in Toksvig found infringement
based on a use of "general concepts" concerning the life of Hans Christian Andersen,
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cisions toward recognition that labor or research is simply not
protectible under the copyright law or the first amendment. 0 8 As the
Fifth Circuit asserted:
The valuable distinction in copyright law between facts and
the expression of facts cannot be maintained if research is
held to be copyrightable. There is no rational basis for dis-
tinguishing between facts and the research involved in ob-
taining facts. To hold that research is copyrightable is no
more or no less than to hold that the facts discovered as a
result of research are entitled to copyright protection. 0 9
Further, it makes no difference if all (Huie) or only some (Orgel) of the
fruits of labor are appropriated. The copyright law may constitution-
ally protect only the writings of authors and not their labor. Insofar as
copyright law is concerned, it makes no difference whether the subse-
quent author takes all, substantially all, or only some of the labor of the
prior author.
In a recent article, Professor Denicola argues to the contrary that
"[t]he effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded
only by linking the existence and extent of protection to the total labor
of production."3 0 Although Professor Denicola may be correct in
maintaining that his scheme would be more "effective" in encouraging
research, his theory relies on the mistaken view that copyright rests, at
least in part, on "[niotions of a natural right to the fruits of one's la-
bor." '311 It is clear that copyright is merely "a means by which an im-
portant public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward .... "312
2. Wholesale Usurpation and Fair Use
The second version of the wholesale usurpation doctrine appears
and the copying of 24 passages. See 181 F.2d at 666. The court also decided that the
defendant did not make a fair use of those concepts and passages. Professor Denicola
apparently believes that Toksvig may represent too "parsimonious" an application of
the fair use doctrine, but fits this case into his scheme of according protection to the
assemblage of facts in a nonfiction narrative and relying on fair use to determine
whether there has been a bodily appropriation. See Denicola, supra note 22, at 538-39.
SOS For a discussion of protection under the misappropriation theory, see 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 73, at § 2.10[E] n.30 (collecting cases); Gorman, supra note 3, at
598-610.
309 Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981).
310 Denicola, supra note 22, at 530.
311 Id. at 519.
312 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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as part of fair use analysis in cases such as Rosemont Enterprises v.
Random House, Inc.31 In Rosemont, the plaintiff sought and obtained
a preliminary injunction against the distribution of the defendant's un-
authorized biography of Howard Hughes. The plaintiff argued that the
biography infringed its copyrights in a series of magazine articles about
Hughes.
3 14
The court of appeals vacated the injunction. In its infringement
analysis, the court noted that the similarity between the biography and
the articles was attributable, at least in part, to the fact that there was
common source material used by both parties."1 5 This fact suggested
that any similarity would be considered "innocent similarity" under
Orgel. The court went on, however, to add that the plaintiff could
claim protection only in the expression, and "could not acquire by
copyright a monopoly in the narration of historical events."' 16 This
reasoning suggested that similarity based on common factual informa-
tion would not be a ground for finding infringement regardless of
whether the defendant obtained the information from a common source
or from the plaintiff's work. With respect to the protected expression,
the court expressed "considerable doubt as to whether the copied and
paraphrased matter constitute[d] a material and substantial portion of
those articles."' 17 The court stated that "the material at most form[ed]
an insubstantial part" of the plaintiff's biography. 1 ' Rather than con-
cluding that the admitted similarity did not constitute infringement, the
court continued with a fair use analysis. The court applied the tradi-
tional fair use criteria 1 9 and held that the defendant's use was a fair
use.
3 2 0
Finally, the court dealt with the wholesale usurpation approach
313 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966).
31 See id. at 304.
316 See id. at 306.
3I8 Id.; see also id. at 309-10 (discussing the requirement that the defendant have
undertaken independent research of historical facts).
317 Id. at 306.
'18 Id. The lower court held that the fair use defense was inapplicable because the
defendant's work was insufficiently "scholarly" and was published "for commercial
purposes." See id. at 308. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant that the
lower court had defined the fair use doctrine too narrowly. See id.
319 The factors considered in a fair use determination are codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1982), reprinted supra note 13.
320 See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306. The court held that it is "reasonable and
customary" for subsequent biographers to use earlier works, including occasional quo-
tations from earlier works. See id. at 307. This use "is permitted because of the public
benefit in encouraging the development of historical and biographical works and their
public distribution, e.g., so 'that the world may not be deprived of improvements, or the
progress of the arts be retarded.'" Id. (quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138,
139 (K.B. 1801)).
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outlined in Huie and Orgel. In its attempt to clarify this approach,
however, the court succeeded only in redirecting the doctrinal confusion
down another channel-fair use. The court rejected the district court's
argument that an author is not entitled to utilize the "fruits of another's
labor in lieu of independent research." '21 Nevertheless, the court held
that Orgel and Huie, which employed the "fruits of labor" theory, were
consistent with the rejection of the lower court's ruling because those
cases stood merely for the proposition that a subsequent author could
not "bodily appropriate" the research of the prior author. According to
the Rosemont court, "bodily appropriation" meant only that "extensive
verbatim copying or paraphrasing of material set down by another can-
not" constitute fair use.
3 22
The Rosemont decision is problematic for several reasons. First, it
is not clear why the court engaged in a fair use analysis in light of its
"considerable doubt" that the defendant copied a substantial portion of
the plaintiff's copyrightable expression. Further, it is unclear whether
the court's doubt in this regard was predicated on the fact that any
similarity was due at least in part to common sources, or whether the
similarity was related to the use of noncopyrighted material from the
plaintiff's work. Second, the court did not disclose whether, in its fair
use analysis, it focused on only the quoted or verbatim portion of the
articles used by the defendant, or whether it looked at all similarities
between the two works. If the latter is the case, then the court was at
least in part deciding what should have been issues of copyrightability
and infringement-whether the defendant's use infringed the plaintiff's
materials considered as a whole, including noncopyrightable por-
tions-in the context of fair use. 23 Third, the court, in relying on pub-
lic interest as a separate fair use factor, injected first amendment con-
siderations into the fair use stage, when it should have accommodated
these concerns at the copyrightability or infringement stages. Fourth,
and most importantly for the present examination, the court purported
to rely on Orgel and Huie in rejecting the "fruits of labor" theory and
in establishing a prohibition on "bodily appropriation," defined as "ex-
tensive verbatim copying or paraphrasing of material." It is clear, how-
321 Id. at 310.
322 Id. Indeed, in evaluating the commercial purpose prong of fair use analysis,
see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982), reprinted supra note 13, the Rosemont court character-
ized Huie and Oxford as fair use cases. See 366 F.2d at 308.
323 To some degree, the court's analysis reflects an earlier notion that fair use
meant copying the ideas in a work, rather than the expression. See, e.g., Shipman v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). This notion
certainly imports copyrightability doctrine into fair use analysis.
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ever, that in Orgel and Huie the notion of "bodily appropriation" was
not part of fair use; rather, it was an infringement doctrine prohibiting
the use of an unacceptable amount of material acknowledged to be in
the public domain.
After Rosemont, two cases adopted a hybrid "wholesale usurpa-
tion" analysis; they maintained Rosemont's conclusion that the whole-
sale usurpation issue is part of fair use analysis, but they also returned
to the "fruits of labor" rationale espoused by Orgel and Huie. In Mere-
dith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers,""4 the plaintiff obtained a
preliminary injunction after alleging that its psychology textbook was
infringed by the defendant's text, which the court found was a "con-
scious paraphrasing" of the plaintiff's text. 25 The court did not bother
to determine whether the admitted similarity was attributable to facts
about psychology that were in the public domain or whether the para-
phrasing was such as to constitute minimal "distinguishable variation"
required to defeat a finding of substantial similarity when the underly-
ing facts are in the public domain. 26 Rather, the court went directly to
the fair use doctrine and, relying on the Rosemont interpretation of
Orgel, held that the defendant had engaged in extensive paraphrasing
of the plaintiff's expression and had copied "the entire structure and
topical sequence" of the plaintiff's book. 27 The court also quoted
Orgel's prohibition against appropriating the fruits of another's labor
in lieu of independent research and emphasized that failing to protect
the plaintiff's work would remove the incentive for someone like the
plaintiff to invest considerable time and energy in research and
scholarship. 28
In the second hybrid case, Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall
Street Transcript Corp., 2' the court of appeals affirmed a preliminary
injunction against the defendants, who had published abstracts of the
plaintiff's institutional research reports. The court recognized that news
events and factual information, as distinguished from their expression,
could not be copyrighted, but then proceeded to define the protectible
expression as "the manner of expression, the author's analysis or inter-
224 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
8 See id. at 688.
38 See, e.g., Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Generation Mills, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1030,
1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Citation Fabrics Corp., 328 F. Supp.
554, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8" Meredith, 378 F. Supp. at 690.
8 See id. Another example of a court employing more than one approach to an
infringement claim can be found in Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). For a discussion of Gardner, see supra note 212.
29, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
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pretation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular
developments." 330
Having defined the protectible expression broadly, the court easily
concluded that the district court was correct in holding that the defend-
ants' appropriation was not privileged under fair use doctrine. The
court noted that "[u]nlike traditional news coverage, . . . [the defend-
ants' work] did not provide independent analysis or research" and that
the defendants appropriated those portions of the plaintiff's works that
represented "a substantial investment of time, money and labor." '31
The court also stated that the defendants' appropriation was intended
to fulfill the demand for plaintiff's work, thus amounting to "chiseling
for personal profit." ' 2
The Wainwright court could have resolved the case without rely-
ing on either its extremely broad definition of protectible expression or
any finding of usurpation of the plaintiff's time and labor. The court
characterized the defendants' appropriation as "almost verbatim" '
and could easily have affirmed the lower court even under the restric-
tive standards of copyrightability found in Oxford and Rosemont. All
prior cases were in agreement that verbatim reproduction of expression
infringes copyright unless excused by fair use. In light of its holding
that the use was intended to supplant the plaintiff's work and
Rosemont's holding that extensive verbatim copying could not constitute
fair use, the Wainwright court could have decided the case on tradi-
tional fair use grounds alone.
In addition to being doctrinally inconsistent with Orgel and Huie,
the fair use version of the wholesale usurpation doctrine involves total-
ity concerns in three respects. First, the doctrine presents too great a
330 Id. at 95-96. This definition was derived from the standard for distinguishing
unprotectible ideas from protectible expression articulated in an earlier case involving
fictional works. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). In some respects, this definition of expression
appears to accord with the Second Circuit's theory in The Nation that the mode of
expression of factual works includes the "total entity." See 723 F.2d at 203. To the
extent that Wainwright's definition of "expression" also includes analysis or interpreta-
tion of factual events, it is clearly inconsistent with Hoehling. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d
at 978.
In addition to the fair use argument, the defendants in Wainwright argued that
the plaintiff's reports were financial "news" and that the defendants' "coverage" of that
news was protected under the first amendment. The court quickly disposed of the first
amendment argument, holding that any conflict between the first amendment and copy-
right law in this case could be resolved by application of the fair use doctrine. See
Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95.
831 Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 96.
332 Id. at 97.
$33 Id. at 96.
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temptation to consider factual information protectible for copyright-
ability and infringement purposes and then to "compensate" by consid-
ering an absence of wholesale usurpation as support for the defendant's
claim of fair use, thus enlarging the scope of the fair use privilege. This
approach has been accepted by Professor Denicola, who argues that at
least until Hoehling, Second Circuit copyright jurispru-
dence-represented most notably by Rosemont and Huie-provided,
and should continue to provide, protection for "particular assemblage[s]
of facts" in nonfiction narratives and collections of factual data. 34 Ac-
cording to Denicola, this protection does not threaten to violate the ax-
iom that facts are noncopyrightable, because the magnitude of appro-
priation must be considered as a factor in both infringement and fair
use determinations.3 5 Denicola's proposal would increase the number
of instances in which courts would find substantial appropriation or
infringement and defendants would be required to rely directly on the
fair use defense. The fair use inquiry would in turn focus on whether
the defendant "bodily appropriated" the factual aggregation.
The problem here is apparent. Denicola accepts a totality ap-
proach that accords copyright protection, beyond mere protection for
arrangement, to groups of elements that taken individually are not
copyrightable. He assures us that this expanded copyright protection
will not conflict with either basic copyright purposes or first amend-
ment concerns. 3 6 The plaintiff will still have to show that the defend-
ant substantially appropriated the assemblage of facts by reproducing
some substantially similar subset of those facts. Even if the plaintiff
makes this showing, the defendant may still argue, in the context of fair
use analysis, that it did not bodily appropriate the assemblage. But a
fair use doctrine that includes a wholesale usurpation concern does not
guarantee that there will be the same level of dissemination of facts as
there would be if factual information were simply deemed unpro-
tectible. There are other factors involved in a fair use inquiry, and
these factors may weigh more heavily against the magnitude-of-use
consideration. Relying on fair use is always much riskier for defendants
than relying on copyrightability or infringement doctrines because of
the inherently ad hoc nature of the fair use doctrine.
Second, it is clear that courts that have applied the wholesale usur-
pation standard as a fair use factor have been concerned about a subse-
quent author expropriating the fruits of a prior author's labors in the
s Denicola, supra note 22, at 538.
3 See id. at 538-39.
336 See id. at 540-41.
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absence of independent research. 3 ' It is no more acceptable to accord
copyright protection to the fruits of labor at the fair use stage, however,
than it is at the initial stages of copyrightability or infringement: the
"fruits of labor" theory is a totality approach at any stage of analysis.
Professor Denicola defends this use of the labor theory of copyright by
reasoning that in fair use analysis it is appropriate to consider whether
the defendant is using factual material to add to earlier contribu-
tions.338 If the defendant is relying primarily or entirely on the plain-
tiff's labor or research, then public benefit resulting from the use de-
creases and the use is not "fair." ' This approach begs the question
because it assumes that the plaintiff's research or labor can be protected
by copyright in the first place. If information is in the public domain,
then there is no infringement and fair use does not apply; one should
not be able to obtain copyright protection for that information by going
through the back door of fair use.
Third, the cases exhibit confusion over whether fair use is to be
determined only after the factfinder decides that there is substantial
similarity,340 or whether a finding of fair use is tantamount to a finding
of the absence of substantial similarity.341 Part of the reason for this
confusion is that one of the fair use factors is the substantiality of the
portion used by the defendant.3 42 Although factfinders are apparently
allowed to consider the quality as well as the quantity of the taking in
deciding substantiality, there may be a temptation to engage in totality
analysis by considering noncopyrightable material in making the quali-
tative examination.""3 This totality concern is exacerbated when the
"' See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding,
under a fair use analysis, "that a writer may be guided by earlier copyrighted
works ...[but] if he appropriate[s] the fruits of another's labors, without alteration,
and without independent research, he violates the rights of the copyright owner"),
afl'd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
338 See Denicola, supra note 22, at 538-39.
s See id. at 538.
340 This interpretation seems consistent with the way in which fair use is charac-
terized in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), reprinted supra note
13.
31 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961); Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
$42 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982), reprinted supra note 13. For cases involving the
substantiality factor, see, for example, Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th
Cir. 1983); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, 378 F. Supp. 686, 689
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974).
... For instance, in discussing this fair use factor, the Fifth Circuit pointed out
that the user who reproduced the covers of TV Guide in comparative advertising "did
not copy what is the essence of TV Guide-the television schedules and articles." Tri-
angle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir.
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wholesale usurpation notion is introduced into fair use analysis; the
factfinder may unwittingly consider the quantity taken without consid-
ering whether the portions appropriated were protectible. This problem
was demonstrated in Meredith, in which the district court, relying on
Rosemont, Huie, and Orgel, focused exclusively on the quantity of in-
formation taken to deny the defendant's claim of fair use. 44 The court
in Meredith never bothered to consider issues of qualitative taking re-
lating to copyrightability or infringement standards.
3. Wholesale Usurpation and Protectible Arrangements
The third branch of the wholesale usurpation doctrine accords to
nonfiction narratives protection similar to that given to compilations or
collections of facts. It is generally accepted that the arrangement and, in
some cases, even the selection of factual matter in materials such as
directories are protected under copyright law, 45 but there is no gener-
ally accepted view concerning the scope of that protection. Some direc-
tory cases even go so far as apparently to protect the data contained in
the directories. 3 "
In certain respects, this version of the doctrine can be traced back
to Hoehling. The commentators seem to agree that Hoehling stands for
the proposition that nothing short of a wholesale usurpation of literal
expression will support a finding of infringement when dealing with
factual works.347 In Hoehling, the Second Circuit applied a dissection
approach insofar as subject matter totality was concerned, but, relying
on Wainwright, cautioned against sanctioning "wholesale usurpation"
or "verbatim reproduction" of expression.3 48 What is confusing here is
that Hoehling made it appear as though actual expression could be
used as long as the works were not "virtually identical" in expres-
sion." It should be noted, however, that the claim in Hoehling was
apparently not that the defendants appropriated actual expression, but
rather that the defendants appropriated a plot and certain facts that,
1980). Because the schedules reflect factual information, factfinders looking at qualita-
tive taking may be considering material that is per se noncopyrightable.
3" See 378 F. Supp. at 689-90, discussed supra notes 324-28 and accompanying
text.
311 The 1976 Copyright Act specifically provides for the protection of compila-
tions. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of compilations); 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982)
(scope of protection).
34' See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (hold-
ing that a directory with sequential telephone numbers infringed the copyright in an
existing alphabetical directory).
" See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 22, at 539; Gorman, supra note 3, at 593-94.
348 See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979-80.
31 See id.
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according to the plaintiff, were copyrightable. The court refused to rec-
ognize that factual information could be copyrighted as the fruit of
one's labor. To the extent that phraseology was identical, the court
found that these similarities all related to scenes afaire.350 Further, the
court did not dispute that the applicable standard of analysis for in-
fringement was whether there had been a wrongful appropriation of
protectible expression resulting in substantial similarity. 51 It appears
that Hoehling was not seeking to replace substantial similarity with
wholesale usurpation; its references to the latter probably reflected
some version of the doctrine employed in Huie, Orgel, Meredith, and
Wainwright.
The wholesale usurpation doctrine that Hoehling hints at appears
most clearly in the court of appeals decision in The Nation. This opin-
ion was written by Judge Kaufman, who also wrote Hoehling. In The
Nation, Judge Kaufman made it clear that protectible "expression" can
have two meanings. First, the narrow definition of "expression," de-
rived from the copyright axiom that facts are not protectible, is "the
ordering and choice of the words themselves." '352 Under this definition,
"paraphrasings of disparate facts" are not prohibited.3 53 If, however,
the subsequent author seeks to paraphrase or mimic the "total entity,"
then Wainwright and Meredith establish that expression understood
broadly as a "total entity" would be wrongfully appropriated. 5' This
50 See id. at 979.
.51 See id. at 977. The reliance in Hoehling on Myers v. Mail & Express Co., 36
Copyright Office Bull. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (L. Hand, J.), see supra note 283 and
accompanying text, is confusing but not necessarily inconsistent with the reading of
Hoehling presented in the text. With respect to a historical work, the sequence and
selection of events may not be copyrightable, and the disparate facts, per se
noncopyrightable, could be used with minor variations. Nevertheless, the "total entity"
might still be protected against "bodily appropriation" of research if a subsequent user
tried merely to "rewrite" the entire original by paraphrasing each statement.
In addition, the Hoehling court relied on Rosemont for the proposition that a his-
torical work could be infringed by a "bodily appropriation" of the "expression" in the
work. See Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 980. This reliance indicates either that Judge Kauf-
man used "expression" to mean the protected "mosaic" or structure (as he did in The
Nation), or that he was referring to the rather confusing aspect of Rosemont that trans-
formed bodily appropriation into a fair use factor. Given the context of Hoehling,
which did not involve fair use analysis, the former interpretation is more likely.
3" The Nation, 723 F.2d at 204.
351 Id. at 203. Judge Kaufman explicitly repudiated the labor theory. See id. at
203 n. 11. As discussed below, see infra notes 354-66 and accompanying text, it would
be nonsensical to reject the labor theory if there is some appropriation, but to accept it
if there is complete appropriation. Nevertheless, in Miller v. Universal City Studios,
650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981), the court interpreted Hoehling as rejecting the labor
theory "absent wholesale appropriation of expression." Id. at 1369 n.3; see also Eckes
v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting protection based on
the labor theory "absent, perhaps, wholesale appropriation").
"" It should be noted that both Wainwright and Meredith relied on the notion
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protection arises because the structure of the work can constitute an
original writing legitimately protected by copyright law, not because
the fruits of labor merit copyright protection.355
Using this distinction, Judge Kaufman stated:
In this case, there can be no concern that this mode of ex-
pression was usurped; The Nation article drew only upon
scattered parts and not the total entity with its unique and
protected mosaic.
If The Nation had taken, for example, all of the book or
all of a chapter and merely changed the language here and
there, paraphrasing would not and should not suffice to pro-
tect it.
3 56
In these passages, the court defined a second "mode of expression,"
distinguishable from the word-for-word literal expression that the court
held could be appropriated through paraphrasing because of the
noncopyrightability of factual information. This second type of expres-
sion consists of the author's structure and arrangement of facts and is
characterized as the "unique and protected mosaic" of the work.
Any grant of protection to a compilation or directory, or to the
selection and arrangement of material in nonfiction narrative, must
raise a further question concerning the standard of infringement to be
employed. In Hoehling and the court of appeals' opinion in The Na-
tion, that standard was usurpation of the "entire totality." Applying
this standard to a factual work may appear to be a "totality" approach,
because the standard seemingly accords copyright protection to some
totality the constituent parts of which may not be protectible."57 On
further reflection, however, it is clear that as long as the underlying
individual facts in the compilation or narrative are not accorded protec-
tion, what is protected is only the authorship embodied in the arrange-
ment; the wholesale appropriation standard guarantees that only the
arrangement will be protected, and it will be protected only against
exact or nearly exact copying.
The difficulty occurs when the standard protects the selection of
that fruits of labor were protectible under copyright law. This notion was rejected by
Judge Kaufman in Hoehling.
315 See The Nation, 723 F.2d at 203.
S56 Id.
"' See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (tele-
phone directory); Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing, 46 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942) (racing report).
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facts as well as the arrangement." 8 For example, in Meredith, the de-
fendant was held to infringe the plaintiff's arrangement and selection
through an extensive taking of "the entire structure and topical se-
quence" of the facts and theories in the plaintiff's textbook on child
psychology."' The problem here is that the selection of relevant topics
by the plaintiff logically represents a "theory" or "idea" concerning the
relevant topics in a field of social science. If copyright protection is ac-
corded to the selection of noncopyrightable facts, the implication is that
an infringement standard that falls short of wholesale appropriation is
being used. The result is tantamount to according copyright protection
to material that is per se noncopyrightable-that is, a totality
approach.3860
Professor Denicola rejects the distinction between arrangement
and selection that I argue for here. He maintains that although courts
most frequently protect only the arrangement of data appearing in a
compilation, this level of protection proves unacceptable because subse-
quent users will escape liability if they appropriate information but not
arrangement. Courts should therefore grant protection to the "particu-
lar collection of data."3'' Although this approach finds little support in
the case law'3 6 2 Professor Denicola correctly recognizes a ready analogy
in "those cases that emphasize the originality in plaintiff's selection or
choice of data."3 6 ' He also properly notes that these cases are based on
"'skill and taste' " in selection. 64 What he fails to note is that "skill
and taste" represent merely an unprotectible idea or the fruits of the
user's labor. He unwittingly but explicitly discusses the most dangerous
"" For example, if a court applies the substantial similarity test to the use of an
arrangement of facts, then there is a danger that use of data within the arrangement
that falls short of taking the arrangement itself will be found to be an infringement.
Professor Gorman argues that copyright protection in a terse and exhaustive directory
should be "thin" and protect only against wholesale appropriation, but that if the direc-
tory or compilation contains original prose or artistry, then the ambit of protection
ought to increase. See Gorman, supra note 3, at 571-72. Professor Gorman's observa-
tion is consistent with the observation made in the text.
3'9 Meredith, 378 F. Supp. at 690.
80 The selection of premium baseball cards was protected by using a substantial
similarity standard in Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984). It
appears, however, that in Eckes there had been a virtual reproduction of expression. See
id. at 863.
361 Denicola, supra note 22, at 530.
62 See, e.g., Triangle Publications v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682, 685-86
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
.3 Denicola, supra note 22, at 530; see, e.g., College Entrance Book Co. v. Am-
sco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1941) (plaintiff's choice and translation of
vocabulary list protected); List Publication Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1887)
(defendant prohibited from using social register instead of compiling its own list).
36, Denicola, supra note 22, at 530-31 (quoting Edward Thompson Co. v. Ameri-
can Law Book Co., 122 F. 922, 924 (2d Cir. 1903)).
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aspect of this protection: "These decisions [on selection or choice] would
appear to indicate a willingness to protect at least certain aggregations
of facts without the necessity of establishing an additional appropria-
tion of the arrangement or pattern of the copyrighted work." ' 5 That is
precisely the problem. As long as only the arrangement is protected
against exact or nearly exact copying, then there is no danger that the
underlying, noncopyrightable facts will receive incidental copyright
protection. Once the protection extends to the selection or choice of
those facts, however, the danger increases that copyright protection will
be extended in a way that will frustrate both the intent of the copyright
law and the constitutional principles that define its ambit. 6
CONCLUSION
The controversy in The Nation highlighted important issues in-
volving copyright protection for factual works. The controversy between
the district court and the court of appeals focused at least in part on
whether noncopyrightable factual material contained in the memoirs
somehow acquired copyright protection by being combined with pro-
tectible expression into a copyrightable totality. The Supreme Court
declined to discuss the merits of the totality approach adopted by the
district court and rejected by the court of appeals, but then in its fair
use analysis relied to some degree on the findings of the district court,
which were predicated on the totality approach. In determining that
Navasky's use of the verbatim quotations did not qualify as a fair use,
the Court truncated substantially the fair use doctrine. Because the
Court has diminished the utility of fair use for accommodating the
broad dissemination of factual works indisputably required by the
copyright law and the first amendment, it is essential to focus on doc-
trines of copyrightability and infringement in order to limit a copyright
holder's monopoly over a factual work. It is equally essential to main-
tain the doctrinal distinctions among the three copyright analy-
ses-copyrightability, infringement, and fair use-in order to avoid the
confusion that results from totality analysis.
Although the totality approach has surfaced in a confused combi-
nation of doctrines involving copyrightability, infringement, and fair
315 Id. at 531.
38 Although the 1976 Copyright Act defines a compilation to include a "collec-
tion . . .of preexisting materials . . .that are selected," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)
(emphasis added), to interpret this the way Professor Denicola does would conflict di-
rectly with the proscription in section 102(b) against extending copyright protection to
any "idea" or "principle."
1986]
598 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
use, it has been shown that totality analysis surfaces in distinctly differ-
ent ways. These versions of totality analysis characterize many copy-
right decisions, and are all present in one or more of the opinions in
The Nation. The totality approach to defining protectible subject mat-
ter characterized the district court's opinion, and, perhaps indirectly,
the Supreme Court's. Totality analysis and the standard for infringe-
ment of protectible expression formed the basis for part of the dispute
between the district court and the court of appeals. Finally, rejection of
the totality approach as it is applied to the wholesale usurpation doc-
trine played a role in the court of appeals opinion.
In all of its manifestations, the totality approach has the same un-
fortunate result: it accords copyright protection to material that is per
se noncopyrightable, thereby frustrating the basic purpose of copyright
law and increasing the tension between copyright and the first amend-
ment. Facts are not copyrightable, and courts must use various devices,
such as excision of noncopyrightable material from the scope of pro-
tectible expression, application of a more narrow standard of infringe-
ment to factual works, and a cautious approach to protecting expression
other than literal expression, in order to assure broad availability of
factual works. If the totality approach is not severely limited, copyright
law will no longer facilitate the widespread dissemination of factual
information.
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